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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s two premierships were different from one 
another, with his second tenure proving to be relatively successful. This study compares 
the two Abe administrations, focusing on agenda setting, economic policy, election 
tactics, and security policy. It provides relevant explanations for Abe’s political success 
in his second administration.  
Abe’s pragmatism in statecraft mainly originated from his own political 
experiences and was crucial for accumulating his political capital and realizing security 
policy. At the domestic level, political influence from former administrations, Abe’s 
unrivaled political performance within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the weakness 
of opposition parties, and an economic downturn influenced his political dominance. 
Regionally, the stronger U.S.-Japan alliance and an increase in Japan’s security concerns 
about China and North Korea supported the development of Abe’s security agenda. 
This analysis has implications for the future of Abe’s normalization trajectory. 
Abe’s dominance may continue; weak domestic checks and balances and the regional 
political situation are likely to remain the same. Abe’s further success will ultimately 
depend on the outcome of his economic policy, which, in turn, may enable his efforts to 
amend the constitution so that Japan can maintain its own armed forces rather than a Self-
Defense Force. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, a strong revisionist, is changing 
fundamental security policy that has been maintained from the time of the “Yoshida 
Doctrine” that emerged after the Second World War. At the same time, he is the only 
prime minister since Prime Minister Yoshida who has led Japan for two non-consecutive 
terms. Abe’s achievements have been quite different between his first and second 
administrations. What factors have brought about the differences between the first and 
second Abe administrations? What has made Abe’s current government a comparative 
success, in contrast to the failure he experienced in his first term as Prime Minister? 
Comparing the first and second Abe administrations will reveal political dynamics that 
might help explain why he has been able to pursue revisionist security policies and 
whether he will continue to be able to do so. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The importance of this research is divided into two dimensions: mechanisms of 
Japanese domestic politics and implication of Abe’s shift in policy. There have been few 
academic efforts to compare the first and second Abe administrations. Although the 
second tenure of Abe’s term in office has not yet ended, it is obvious that the second term 
is relatively successful, unlike the first term in office. Unlike during the first tenure, the 
political coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the New Komei Party has 
won multiple elections. They still maintain a majority in the congress, and the cabinet’s 
approval ratings are also high, even after passing a Collective Self-Defense bill that 
caused protest among the Japanese. Moreover, within the LDP, Abe established 
unparalleled political power extending to 2018 by being re-elected as the LDP president. 
Even though the political environment between Abe’s first and second administrations 
might be similar, comparing these two terms can reveal mechanisms of Japanese 
domestic politics, what Abe has learned from his failure, and what factors have made Abe 
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successful so far. Japanese political dynamics may be better understood by analyzing two 
terms in office with the same political principal but firmly different political outcomes.  
At the same time, Japan is facing the increasing likelihood the Abe administration 
will reshape the grand strategy known as the Yoshida Doctrine that has been maintained 
since the end of the Second World War. Japanese security and foreign policy was defined 
by the Yoshida Doctrine under the 1955 System.1 Richard J. Samuels evaluated Japan’s 
grand strategy by saying, “Since the Cold War, Japan’s long-established consensus on a 
grand strategy that privileges economic over military strength under a protective U.S. 
shield has been unraveling.”2 By signing the Security Treaty with the United States under 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japan could develop as a commercial state and 
achieve great economic power. The Yoshida Doctrine shaped Japan’s grand strategy, 
formed by combining the two elements of Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
exquisitely. 
Abe’s vision for normalization is the central ideology of his plans to remodel 
Japan’s future. Although the Yoshida Doctrine had achieved high growth and economic 
capability, this strategy is not a normal strategy in the eyes of Abe and his supporters 
because the Constitution was written by American occupiers. A goal of the normalization 
trajectory is rewriting Article 9 so that Japan can maintain its own armed forces, not the 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Abe argued that Japan’s constitution should be revised for 
the state to play a more active role toward the world and emphasized this goal again to 
the Japanese by saying that “People of Japan, be confident!” in a speech to Parliament in 
2015.3  
Regardless of the debate about Japan’s future, the Japanese normalization 
trajectory would have a great impact on the foreign countries of East Asia as well as the 
                                                 
1 The 1955 System is a name for Japan’s unique party system from 1955 to 1993. In the 1955 System, 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was dominant as a ruling party, and prime ministers elected from the 
LDP had a great role to shape Japan’s security and foreign policy. 
2 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of Ease Asia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), ix. 
3 Martin Fackler, “Prime Minister Abe Appeals to Japanese on Pacifist Constitution,” The New York 
Times, 12 February 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/asia/abe-makes-impassioned-appeal-
to-change-constitution.html?_r=0. 
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Japanese. For China and South Korea, Japan’s remilitarization is still a sensitive security 
concern. If Japan were successful in rearmament, a security issue that has not changed in 
the 70 years since the end of the Second World War will take on a different dimension, 
because Japan has two territorial disputes within the region: the Senkaku (Diaoyudao) 
Islands with China and Dok-do (Takeshima) Island with South Korea. As Japan’s and 
China’s relationship was worsening, the Collective Self-Defense bill passed. Abe is 
getting closer to his “beautiful country.”4 Therefore, it is meaningful to anticipate further 
movements of the Japanese normalization trajectory in the Abe administration and the 
role of Abe’s revisionist security policies in achieving this trajectory. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will look into sources that discuss Abe’s personal 
characteristics and political background, distinguish the differences between his first and 
second terms in office, and also review several analytical articles about Prime Minister 
Abe. 
Shinzo Abe is the first Prime Minister of Japan born after the Second World War. 
He is also one of the youngest and the most conservative prime ministers ever since the 
Second World War. These characteristics are related to his personal background. Abe 
comes from a politically noble family; three generations of his family are politicians, 
including Abe. It is well known to the public that Nobusuke Kishi, the former prime 
minister of Japan, is the father of Abe’s mother. Abe reminisced about Kishi and his 
grandfather’s influence on him in his book, Toward a Beautiful Country, as follows: 
“Some people used to point to my grandfather as a ‘Class-A war criminal suspect,’ and I 
felt strong repulsion. Because of that experience, I may have become emotionally 
                                                 
4 Martin Fackler, “Timing is Everything: Abe’s Playbook for Military Normalization,” The Diplomat, 
1 July 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/timing-is-everything-abes-playbook-for-military-
normalization/. 
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attached to ‘conservatism,’ on the contrary. Since my childhood, in my eyes, my 
grandfather was a sincere statesman who only thought about the future of this country.”5  
This perspective of Abe’s is reflected in his political style, since Kishi was Abe’s 
political role model. Abe’s hawkish stance, handed down from Kishi, appealed to the 
public when diplomatic issues with North Korea occurred. 6  Under the Koizumi 
administration, Abe already commanded political popularity as a hardliner against North 
Korea for its abduction of Japanese. At the last stage of the Koizumi administration, Abe 
was the strongest candidate to become the next leader and called “post-Koizumi.” Abe 
succeeded Koizumi as prime minister of Japan in 2006. 
The outcomes of the first Abe administration, however, did not match his keen 
enthusiasm. Although the first Abe administration started with high approval ratings of 
above 70 percent in September 2006, six months later in March 2007, cabinet approval 
ratings sharply dropped to 40 percent, before eventually reaching 24.3 percent.7 Finally, 
Abe received a fatal blow as prime minister after a defeat in the Upper House election in 
2007. His short term in office as Prime Minister prevented Abe from executing his 
diverse and bold policies: a revision of Article 9, defense, and security policy focusing on 
an expansion of self-defense rights, a revision of history textbooks (one of the most 
controversial issues), and economic policies to balance the budget. Abe surprised the 
public by announcing his intention to suddenly resign from office due to health problems. 
Another interpretation, however, is that a sudden drop in the approval of the cabinet 
forced Abe to resign. Abe’s resignation seemed to be critical for his political life to some 
extent, because no prime minister in Japan had ever taken power again after a first term, 
except Shigeru Yoshida. 
                                                 
5 Reiji Yoshida, “Formed in Childhood, Roots of Abe’s Conservatism Go Deep,” The Japan Times, 26 
December 2012. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/26/national/formed-in-childhood-roots-of-
abes-conservatism-go-deep#.V0O8OlcZnjA; Shinzo Abe, Utsukushii kuni e [Toward a Beautiful Country], 
(Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2006), 20–21. 
6 Bryan Walsh, “The Abe Enigma,” Time, September 11, 2006, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501060918-1533514,00.html.  
7 “2007nen 8gatsu chosa” [2007 August Poll], TV Asahi, August 2007, http://www.tv-
asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/200708/index.html.  
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Several scholars have analyzed the reasons for the political weakness of Prime 
Minister Abe in his first term. These reasons include electoral system reform, several 
scandals in the cabinet, Abe’s modest economic and welfare policies, and the rising 
strength of the DPJ. Pekkanen focuses on structural changes in Japanese politics after the 
1990s. The change of the electoral system from a medium-sized electoral district system 
to a primarily single-member electoral district system in the 1990s brought about 
fundamental changes in Japan’s politics. Pekkanen argues that while political factions 
had a decisive role under the 1955 System, these fundamental changes in the 1990s made 
the prime minister’s leadership and the cabinet’s influence central in Japanese politics.8 
Therefore, from the perspective of Pekkanen, several scandals among the first Abe 
administration’s cabinet—resulting in five ministers resigning and one suicide—
weakened Abe’s leadership and created a sudden drop in the cabinet’s approval ratings. 
This left a critical scar on Abe’s political reputation. 
The trend of weak factions and stronger prime minister and cabinet was also 
confirmed by a survey by Kim and Park. Kim and Park argue that Japanese political 
changes resulting from electoral reform have influenced the length of the prime 
minister’s term in office.9 Before reform, even when the approval of the cabinet was low, 
strong factional power could shape elections under the medium-sized electoral district 
system. After electoral reform, the advocacy of the prime minister and cabinet had a 
greater role to influence the elections. Since the LDP, the ruling party, often replaced the 
prime minister if his approval had fallen, the average length of a prime minister’s term in 
office became relatively short after reform.10 The survey shows that after reform, the 
people’s approval of the cabinet became a key indicator of the political stability of the 
prime minister.11 
                                                 
8 Robert Pekkanen, “What Is Koizumi’s Legacy? Evaluating Change in Fukuda’s LDP,” Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program Special Report 139 (January 2008): 8, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Japan_Political1.pdf.  
9 Sang-Joon Kim and Ho-Seong Park, “Political Change and the Terms of Prime Minister in Japan: 
From Political Faction to Support Rate,” The Korean Journal for Japanese Studies 38 (2013): 128–9. 
10 Ibid., 128. 
11 Ibid., 128–9. 
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Fujihira takes a policy-oriented perspective. Fujihira mentions Abe’s own book, 
Toward a Beautiful Country, pointing out that, “Abe’s core problem was the fundamental 
gap between its ideological ambition and the modesty of its economic and welfare policy 
record.”12 During his first tenure, few economic policies existed to distinguish Abe from 
Koizumi. Abe’s policy priorities were “education, defense, and constitutional reform,” 
while the top priorities of the majority of Japanese were welfare and economic issues 
such as social security reform and job creation.13 In other words, Abe’s policies did not 
reflect what the public wanted. 
Saito considers the political environmental dimension, focusing on the 
competition for political power between parties. 14  Saito emphasizes, especially, the 
influence of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was the main opposition party 
in Japan. In the 2007 Upper House election, the DPJ defeated the coalition of the LDP 
and the Komei Party and became a majority in the Upper House for the first time; on the 
other hand, the LDP lost control of both houses for the first time in history.15 According 
to Saito, the DPJ was well-situated to compete against the coalition of the LDP and the 
Komei Party and performed better in the election than the LDP.16 Putting it differently, 
this revealed that the coalition of the LDP and the Komei Party would be “insuperable.”17  
These factors stated above are important not only for understanding how people 
analyze Abe’s failure but also for understanding what areas have been changed in the 
second term from his experiences. In the 2012 general election, Abe came back by 
defeating the DPJ, which had achieved historical regime change in 2009. More 
surprisingly, the second Abe administration also started with a high cabinet approval of 
                                                 
12 Shinju Fujihira, “Legacies of the Abe Administration,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars Asia Program Special Report 139 (January 2008): 13, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Japan_Political1.pdf.  
13 Ibid., 9.  
14 Jun Saito, “The Democratic Party of Japan and Japan’s Future,” Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars Asia Program Special Report 139 (January 2008): 15, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Japan_Political1.pdf.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 17. 
17 Ibid., 16. 
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62.4 percent, as good as the former administration’s. Unlike Abe’s first administration, 
cabinet approval above 45 percent was maintained until the first half of 2015. After Abe 
returned, what happened?  
Abe hinted at several changes in an interview with Foreign Affairs. He confessed 
to the failure of his first tenure as prime minister as follows: “When I served as prime 
minister last time, I failed to prioritize my agenda. I was eager to complete everything at 
once, and ended my administration in failure.”18  As mentioned above, Abe’s policy 
priorities were ideological issues such as patriotic education, defense and constitutional 
reform of Article 9. While these issues might be important to Abe and his supporting 
groups, they leaned toward overly conservative agendas that were also not familiar to the 
ordinary Japanese.  
In his tenure, Abe changed his agendas and top priorities from ideological issues 
to public welfare and more concern for the stabilization of the people’s livelihood. He 
stated in the interview: 
After resigning, for six years I traveled across the nation simply to listen. 
Everywhere, I heard people suffering from having lost jobs due to 
lingering deflation and currency appreciation. Some had no hope for the 
future. So it followed naturally that my second administration should 
prioritize getting rid of deflation and turning around the Japanese 
economy…Let’s say that I have set the priorities right this time to reflect 
the concerns of the people, and the results are increasingly noticeable, 
which may explain the high approval ratings.19 
Abe’s efforts in his second tenure hit the mark for the Japanese. Based on the 
strong advocacy of the cabinet, Abe achieved several things that could not be 
accomplished during his first term in office: promoting a bold economic policy known as 
Abenomics, visiting the Yasukuni shrine in 2013, taking a hardline foreign affairs stance 
with respect to Northeast Asia, deciding to promote the right of collective self-defense 
through the cabinet’s re-interpretation of Japan’s Constitution, and guiding revision of a 
renewed school textbook. 
                                                 
18 Jonathan Tepperman, “Japan is Back: A Conversation with Shinzo Abe,” Foreign Affairs, 
July/August 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2013-05-16/japan-back.  
19 Ibid. 
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One of the most significant differences between Abe’s first and second 
administrations is that Abe is politically materializing his visions in the real world 
through a step-by-step process. As I mentioned above, however, academic surveys 
comparing Abe’s two tenures are insufficient; many of the articles and surveys focus on 
the more controversial issues around Japan such as amendment of Article 9, possibility of 
normalization and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and security and foreign 
policies of Japan. Therefore, more specific research is required to figure out reasonable 
explanations and find evidence about different outcomes of the two terms in office. This 
thesis will pursue the nature of Abe’s successes and apply the implications to Japanese 
politics. Also, based on these findings, the research will predict the direction of the Abe 
administration. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis contains several assumptions to explain what factors led to Abe’s 
relatively successful outcomes during his second tenure compared to his first tenure. First, 
it is assumed that Abe’s visions to reshape Japan into “a beautiful country” did not 
change during his terms in office. Abe’s specific visions and beliefs were described well 
in his own book, Toward a Beautiful Country.20 Second, as Pekkanen, Kim and Park 
argued earlier, the prime minister’s leadership became more important in domestic 
politics than political factions’ power. In other words, kantei-initiated politics (the office 
of the Prime Minister) is still valid and plays a significant role in Japanese politics. This 
trend was more conspicuous, particularly, after the Koizumi administration. 21  Third, 
following the second assumption, approval ratings of the cabinet and results of elections 
are important political indicators for prime ministers to evaluate the political stability of 
the regime and whether more challenging policy enactments might be attempted.  
Based on these assumptions, it is possible to establish the following three 
hypotheses: First, having learned lessons from his last tenure, Abe now uses several 
                                                 
20 Abe, Utsukushii kuni e [Toward a Beautiful Country]. 
21 Ikubo Kabashima and Gill Steel, “The Koizumi Revolution,” Political Science & Politics 40 
(January 2007): 79–84.  
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political strategies to ensure regime stability: agenda setting, economic policy, election 
tactics, and security policy. Having matured in his political experiences, Abe manages the 
approval ratings of the cabinet and elections to balance his hawkish behaviors and 
policies. Second, Abe’s successful economic policy, Abenomics, has been a vital strategy 
to build political credibility among the public, and he is likely to continue to use 
economic policy in this way. Third, Abe takes advantage of internal and external political 
circumstances, such as shifting domestic party politics or a rising China, to advance his 
hawkish policies. Specific ideas and evidence to support these hypotheses follow. 
Abe’s use of several new strategies in his second term allowed him to maintain 
regime stability while deliberately progressing toward revisionist policies. Unlike the first 
term, during which Abe tried to complete all his hawkish visions at once, the second term 
started with his distinctive economic policy, as Abe revealed in the interview when he 
returned. Abenomics was the top priority among his policies. Economic issues were 
significant for the Japanese due to the long-term stagnation of the economy since the 
1990s. If Abenomics provided for the Japanese by giving a positive image for the 
economy restoration, Abenomics could be a critical source of approval. Consequently, 
Abenomics appealed to the Japanese.22 
Abe’s political skills are also more mature than those of his last term. Abe’s new 
strategy was continuously reflected in the 2013 Upper House election. Abe shouted a 
slogan of “economic revival” based on Abenomics, and it was successful. The LDP 
regained a majority by defeating the DPJ, which had had the majority since the 2007 
election, and the Japanese gave Abe the power to control both houses. Interestingly, as 
soon as Abe achieved political stability, he visited the Yasukuni shrine for his first time 
as a prime minister.23  Likewise, this shows that Abe considered a balance between 
hawkish behavior and political stability. It seemed to be a politically calculated procedure 
in advance. 
                                                 
22 Gerald L. Curtis, “Abe and the LDP Are Back. Now What?” Ninth Annual Lecture on Japanese 
Politics, Columbia University, 25 September 2013, 
http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/rtfiles/japan/Gerald%20Curtis%20summary%20report.pdf.  
23 Rupert Wingfield, “Japan PM Shinzo Abe Visits Yasukuni WW2 shrine” BBC News, 26 December 
2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25517205.  
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In addition, internal and external political factors help Abe to have political 
strength and to execute revision plans toward Japanese normalization. For example, 
internally, the DPJ, because of its weak power, could not play an active role presenting 
checks and balances against Abe, even though Abe’s policies for normalization were still 
controversial. Natural disasters like the Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami/nuclear 
accident on March 11, 2011 disappointed the Japanese in government leadership under 
the DPJ due to poor responses, but strengthened people’s concerns about national 
security.24 
Externally, especially with respect to security, the threat of the Senkaku Islands 
conflict with rising China, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons, help Abe to execute more 
conservative and hardline policies. Although the public protested the Collective Self-
defense bill, it was passed by cabinet decision. Soon after, the cabinet recovered its 
approval ratings. Another factor promoting Abe’s security policy was the U.S. 
confirmation of support of the Japanese government through the U.S.-Japan defense 
cooperation guidelines in 2015.25 These internal and external factors provide the Abe 
administration opportunities by establishing a relatively favorable political environment 
compared to the first Abe administration. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will be organized around a comparative case study focused on the first 
and second Abe administrations. As a comparative case study, this research benefits from 
the uniqueness of Abe’s administrations because no precedent exists in Japanese history 
in which the same person executed two non-consecutive terms as a prime minister and, at 
the same time, produced contrasting political outcomes. 
Put simply, this research is looking for the answers about what happened between 
both tenures, what differences there are, and why those outcomes came about. To analyze 
                                                 
24 Bruce Klinger, “Fukushima Crisis Shows Weakness in Japanese Crisis Management,” Northeast 
Asia Asian Studies Center, 12 October 2011, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/10/fukushima-crisis-shows-weakness-in-japanese-
crisis-management.  
25 Sheila A. Smith, “Reinterpreting Japan’s Constitution,” Asia Unbound (blog), 2 July 2014, 
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/07/02/reinterpreting-japans-constitution/.  
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these problems, I will examine several independent variables related to Prime Minister 
Abe’s record of performance: political strategies, such as flexibility in policy 
prioritization, application, and timing; and the internal and external political environment. 
First, political strategies of two tenures are compared in order of the following 
sub-variables: agenda setting, economic policy, election tactics, and security policy. Each 
sub-variable is evaluated by matching political indicators such as approval ratings of 
cabinet and election results. The economic policy section in the second term will be 
focused on Abenomics. The second and third independent variables are more focused on 
the second tenure. By analyzing how Abe executed modest policies and hawkish policies 
and under what conditions, I will determine the specific correlation between political 
indicators and policy execution. Furthermore, I will examine how Abe exploits the 
domestic and international political environments for his hawkish policies. 
Finally, this thesis will review the existing literature (official publications such as 
government documents and statistical sources, scholarly books, articles written by 
industry experts, and blogs from credible analysts) to ensure analytic breadth and propose 
convincing explanations to these major research questions. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Following the introduction of this thesis, Chapter II will compare Abe’s political 
policies during the two tenures: agenda setting, economic policy, election tactics, and 
security policy. The major policy differences will be found in Chapter II. Chapter III will 
explore more specific correlations between Abe’s political style and political indicators 
during Abe’s first and second terms in office. This will reveal how Abe’s political 
strategy connects to his regime stability in his second term. Chapter IV and V will 
examine how political circumstances influence Abe’s policies and contribute to regime 
stability. The conclusion, Chapter VI, will answer the research question posed in the 
introduction chapter and provide implications for Japanese politics generally, as well as 
for revisionist security policies. 
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II. COMPARING ABE’S TWO TENURES 
Shinzo Abe is one of the most unusual politicians in Japan because he was elected 
as a leader of the state in two non-consecutive terms. The first term in office was 
relatively short, from 2006 to 2007. Abe was back in 2012 and gained a second 
opportunity to serve as a prime minister. His second tenure continues at the time of this 
writing, and his approval rating does not seem to be a direct threat to his office. This 
chapter compares Abe’s policies between the first and the second administration and 
identifies major differences reflecting what he has learned. This chapter will explore how 
the changes between Abe’s first and second administration can be understood through 
four intertwining themes: agenda setting, economic policy, election tactics, and security 
policy. For analysis, this section will focus on those four parts in terms of a comparative 
research scope. Comparison of each of these themes between the two terms in office will 
reveal the political lessons that Abe has learned from the last administration’s failure, 
Abe’s political strategy to manage state affairs of the second tenure, and features of 
current Japanese political dynamics. 
A. AGENDA SETTING 
Abe put different points on his agendas between his two terms in office. While 
Abe emphasized ideological issues to the Japanese people in the first tenure, he turned to 
a more pragmatic position in the second term calling for economic revival. 
1. Abe’s First Tenure 
Abe had been appointed to the LDP presidency in September 2006. By winning a 
presidential election of the LDP, Abe became the successor to Prime Minister Koizumi. 
Koizumi served in office from 2001 to 2006, maintaining high popularity during his 
tenure. Koizumi is often evaluated as one of the most successful Prime Ministers in Japan 
for pushing economic reforms, including the privatization of the Japanese postal service 
and government debt.26 Abe also enjoyed the confidence of the Japanese people as a 
                                                 
26 Kabashima and Steel, “The Koizumi Revolution,” 79–84. 
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member of the Koizumi Cabinet. It was well known to the public that Abe, a chief 
negotiator of the Cabinet, played an active part in receiving Kim Jong-il’s apology for the 
Japanese abduction issue at the 2002 Japan-North Korea summit. 27  With great 
expectations, the first Abe administration started. 
Abe’s main agenda as a prime minister was to deal with ideological discourse. On 
29 September 2006, through the first policy speech in the 165th session of the Diet, Abe 
addressed “a beautiful country” as a vision of the Prime Minister. In the speech, Abe 
described “a beautiful country” as follows. 
Firstly, “a beautiful country, Japan” is a country that values culture, 
tradition, history, and nature. Secondly, “a beautiful country, Japan” is a 
country underpinned by free society, respects discipline, and has dignity. 
Thirdly, “a beautiful country, Japan” is a country that continues to possess 
the vitality to grow toward the future. And fourthly, “a beautiful country, 
Japan” is a country that is trusted, respected, and loved in the world, and 
which demonstrates leadership.28 
Discourse of “a beautiful country” was close Abe’s political philosophy that he had long 
maintained as a politician. Abe is known as the first Prime Minister born in the postwar 
period and also as the youngest national leader after the end of the Second World War. 
Abe regarded Japan’s current image as abnormal. In his book, Toward a Beautiful 
Country, Abe expressed his regret that Japanese were used to taking a passive stance due 
to their concerns about their historical legacy in the past whenever any present-day 
troubles occurred among countries.29 Also, Abe stressed that Japanese should be proud 
that Japan has devoted itself to protect freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of 
law, as well as contributing to the world in diverse ways in the 60 years since the end of 
the Second World War.30 Abe seemed to have a strong belief that changing the Japanese 
self-image from being past-oriented to future-oriented was his duty. 
                                                 
27 Wada Haruki, “Kim Jong-il and the Normalization of Japan-North Korea Relations,” The Asia-
Pacific Journal, 10, issue 9 (FEB 2012), http://apjjf.org/2012/10/9/Wada-Haruki/3699/article.html.  
28 Shinzo Abe, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 165th Session of the Diet,” 
(speech, the 165th Session of the Diet, 29 September 2006), 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2006/09/29speech_e.html.  
29 Abe, Utsukushii kuni e [Toward a Beautiful Country], 150. 
30 Ibid. 
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This ideological agenda was reflected through education reform. Abe wanted to 
rebuild education in order to realize his goal of “a beautiful country” for the young 
generation.31 Abe appealed to the public for support of the early enactment of the new 
education bill, and finally a revised Fundamental Law of Education was passed, the so-
called “patriotic education law,” on 22 December 2006. Additionally, Abe set agendas to 
introduce diverse policies of the new government such as economy policy, “healthy and 
safe society,” and “shift to proactive diplomacy.”32 Even in those policies, Abe linked 
between the “a beautiful country” metaphor and his design of state. For example, Abe 
indirectly emphasized a new state identity, a revision of the Constitution and collective 
self-defense using the “a beautiful country” discourse. By setting these agendas, Abe 
implied that his strong ideologically-colored policies would be propelled in the first 
administration. 
2. Abe’s Second Tenure 
When Abe returned to office for the second time as Prime Minister, he brought a 
more pragmatic agenda. During the governing by the DPJ over three years, the Japanese 
public was frustrated by poor state management and a continuous economic recession.33 
Throughout the campaign of the 2012 general election, Abe strongly pledged himself to 
build an economic restoration. The economy issue leaped into the top priority of the 
second tenure of the Abe administration after the LDP regained power. 
On 26 December 2012, at the first press conference after Abe was designated the 
96th Japanese Prime Minister, he clarified his economic revival plan to the public. Abe 
declared that defining the revival of the current economy was an urgent issue, and that the 
first mission of the Cabinet was to restore a robust economy.34 Repeatedly, Abe proposed 
three specific economic policies known as “three arrows,” or collectively as 
                                                 
31 Abe, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 165th Session of the Diet.” 
32 Ibid. 
33 Michael J. Green, “US-Japan Relations: Meet the New Boss/Same as the Old Boss?” Comparative 
Connections 14.3 (Jan 2013).  
34 Shinzo Abe, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” (speech, the press conference, 26 
December 2012), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201212/26kaiken_e.html.  
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“Abenomics,” the major economic policy of the second Abe administration. The three 
arrows were monetary policy, fiscal policy, and structural reform that promote private 
sector investment.35  
Officially, Abe set economic revival as a top priority of the Cabinet, and set the 
three specific economic policies at the first press conference after the Prime Minister 
Inauguration. Considering that the policies he presented were not simple policies, 
Abenomics had to have been prepared well in advance:  Abe had been making plans 
about economic policy. In this sense, Abenomics had to be the main factor to determine 
his path through his second tenure. In retrospect, Abe’s strategic choice played a 
significant role to lay the foundation of political stability in his term in office by evoking 
for the Japanese people a sense of economic expectations. Economic policy was given a 
more important role than during Abe’s first term in office.  
Comparing the primary policies of the two tenures, they look quite different. 
Ideological issues were the top priority policy in the first tenure, but during the second 
tenure, the priority of the agenda had been changed to more pragmatic issues concerning 
economic restoration. This is probably due to Abe’s failures during his first tenure, which 
he had time to review while out of office over the five years afterwards. This process can 
be inferred from an Abe interview:  Abe looked back on what he had learned from the 
last administration by saying that “Six years ago, I had only just turned 52, so I was 
younger than I am now and on fire with ideals, but it is also true that I was excessively 
eager to realize my ideas.”36 Considering this statement, Abe seems to have learned a 
lesson from his past management of state affairs.  
Other policies were sketched, but those were mostly secondary before the LDP 
secured the majority of both Houses of the Diet. Although the LDP achieved a majority 
in the Lower House in the prior 2012 general election, the DPJ still maintained a majority 
in the Upper House. Other key issues for Abe included the energy issue, especially use of 
nuclear power; security issues such as the National Defense Program Guidelines and 
                                                 
35 Abe, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.”  
36 Ibid. 
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Midterm Defense Plan distributed by the DPJ; and re-interpreting the Japanese 
Constitution to enable the collective self-defense.37 To secure those policies, Abe and the 
LDP had to anticipate the result of the Upper House election in July 2013. Therefore, a 
trajectory and a success of Abenomics was significant to both Abe and the LDP. 
B. ECONOMIC POLICY 
Although Japanese people regarded a better economy as a significant part of their 
living standards, Prime Minister Abe had a huge gap in commitment toward the economy 
between the two tenures. In the first tenure, the Japanese public was disappointed in 
Abe’s relatively little concern toward the economy and pension scandal. In the second 
tenure, however, economic policy contributed to political stability since Abe propelled 
Abenomics, his main economic policy, as a top priority agenda. This section will briefly 
compare economic policy between both tenures and mainly examine Abenomics and its 
implications for the second Abe administration. 
1. Abe’s First Tenure  
The Japanese public was highly concerned about the economy. Former Prime 
Minister Koizumi drove strong economic reform, including postal service privatization, 
which replaced the government-owned old Postal Services Agency with full private 
postal service companies. This economic reform was widely supported by the Japanese 
public because the majority of the proponents believed that the old postal service was one 
of huge sources to cause economic corruption. They stressed that postal privatization 
would allow Japan’s economy to foster economic efficiency and flexibility and would 
help the nation escape its endemic economic stagnation since the 1990s. Koizumi’s postal 
privatization bill finally passed through support from the public, which led to a LDP win 
in the general election of September 2005. 
Japanese expectations toward economic reform continued with a new prime 
minister, Abe, who was a successor to Koizumi. Through the government-initiated 
extensive economic reform, the Japanese public looked forward to upgrading their living 
                                                 
37 Michael J. Green, “US-Japan Relations: Back on Track,” Comparative Connections 15.1 (May 
2013). 
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standard. According to the Japanese public opinion conducted by Asahi TV station on 
27–28 September 2006, almost half of the Japanese public had expected that the new Abe 
administration would continue to accelerate Koizumi’s economic reform mood (47 
percent positive for economic reform, 21 percent negative, 32 percent no response).38  
During his first tenure, however, Abe did not satisfy the public’s desire for 
economic reform because Abe and the LDP, the ruling party, clearly showed little 
commitment to economic reform. For instance, politicians who were against Koizumi’s 
economic reform agenda came back to the LDP. 39  Abe allowed the purged LDP 
politicians to return because Abe believed that a return of those members would be 
helpful to win the Upper House election.40 This angered the public, however. According 
to a poll on 2–3 December 2006, 66 percent of the Japanese public criticized the LDP’s 
decision to allow those political defectors against Koizumi economic reform to return to 
the LDP.41 Furthermore, 80 percent of the Japanese people thought that Prime Minister 
Abe had not provided sufficient explanation for purged members rejoining the party.42 
The public asked Abe to accelerate Koizumi’s economic reform. Consequently, the LDP 
failed to win the 2007 Upper House election, and Abe also failed to hold people’s support 
for the cabinet. 
In May 2007, the major opposition party, the DPJ, revealed that the Social 
Insurance Agency had lost 50 million records of individual pension payers.43 As a result, 
a pension scandal directly crippled the first Abe administration. Although this scandal 
happened well before Abe became prime minister, it was enough to negatively impact his 
administration. Regarding the pension scandal, the Japanese people were disappointed 
                                                 
38 “2006nen 9gatsu chosa” [2006 September Poll], TV Asahi, September 2006, http://www.tv-
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due to the irresponsibility of the government, and this anger was directly reflected in the 
falling approval rating of the cabinet. Compared to the high approval rating of over 70 
percent at the beginning of September 2006, in June 2007, the approval rating of the Abe 
administration dropped to 33.5 percent. 44  It seemed doubtful that the public would 
recover their confidence in the cabinet. 
Abe’s strong enthusiasm for pushing an ideological agenda, discussed previously 
in this chapter, and relatively low economic concerns undermined his commitment to 
economic reform in a short period of the first administration. A sudden drop of domestic 
approval ratings of the cabinet in 2007 and Abe’s health problems stopped further 
opportunities promote an economic agenda. 
2. Abe’s Second Tenure 
When Abe was back in the cabinet in December 2012, he introduced Abenomics 
as a core strategy to achieve a new economic revival and end the stagnation of the past 
two decades. Abe’s strong pledge focused on revitalizing the Japanese economy and 
raising people’s living standards. As stated earlier in the chapter, Abenomics composed 
three specific main policies called “three arrows.” The first arrow, the aggressive 
monetary policy, proposed to improve the stock market by aiding intensive quantitative 
easing, at the same time to increase trade benefits by suppressing the currency value.45 In 
particular, through intimate cooperation between the cabinet and Bank of Japan (BOJ), 
the cabinet intended to provide the market with persistent quantitative easing and to 
achieve 2 percent inflation as well. Flexible fiscal policy, the second arrow, was a plan of 
reflationary measures by extensive governmental expenditure. Abe pushed a bold 
stimulus package on infrastructure projects for economic revival. The last arrow, a 
growth strategy, referred to induce growth potential through structural reform and growth 
industries such as transforming agriculture and expanding the workforce for women.46  
                                                 
44 “2007nen 6gatsu chosa” [2007 June Poll], TV Asahi, June 2007, http://www.tv-
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45 Robert Looney, “Japan Economy,” Europa World Plus, 2016, www.europaworld.com.  
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a. Abenomics: Three Arrows 
The aggressive monetary policy, the heart of Abenomics, focused on creating 
sustained economic growth. On 20 March 2013, Abe appointed Haruhiko Kuroda as 
Governor of the BOJ. This was the first step to promote the first arrow because Kuroda 
was one of economic experts to support monetary easing. Kuroda revealed a plan to 
escape from endemic deflation by introducing quantitative and qualitative monetary 
easing in spring 2007. Its basic thinking was as follows: “The bank should do whatever is 
necessary to overcome deflation. It should strongly and clearly commit itself to the 
achievement of the price stability target of 2% as its responsibility. It should convey its 
strong policy stance with clarity and intelligibility. It should enter a new phase of 
monetary easing both in terms of quantity and quality in order to underpin its 
commitment.” 47  According to Robert Looney, the principles of Abenomics are 
straightforward.48 Through monetary easing, nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and tax revenues will increase; then, real economic growth will decrease governmental 
expenditure following drop in unemployment and the need for social requirements; 
finally, this process enables the government financial status to be more in balance by 
eliminating an option of tax increase that could cause economic recession again. 49 
Therefore, targeting inflation of 2 percent was a central concept for inducing domestic 
consumption because expectation of lower prices in the near future could postpone 
household consumption expenditures. 50  Under these mechanisms, the monetary plan 
aimed to support the success of Abenomics.  
With the aggressive monetary policy, Abe also planned a large scale of 
government expenditure for economic restoration. On 11 January 2013, Abe announced a 
new fiscal policy known as Emergency Economic Measures for The Revitalization of the 
                                                 
47 Haruhiko Kuroda, “Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing,” Speech at a Meeting Held by 
the Yomiuri International Economic Society in Tokyo, 12 April 2013, 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/koen_2013/data/ko130412a1.pdf.  




Japanese Economy at the Prime Minister Press Conference.51 The cabinet decided to 
support three main areas on emergency economic stimulus measures with government 
expenditures totaling 10.3 trillion yen (U.S. $101 billion). The fiscal policy identified 
three priority areas. First, “Reconstruction and Disaster Prevention” was planned for 
reconstruction of areas damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquake and better natural 
disaster prevention (3.8 trillion yen). Second, “Creation of Wealth through Growth” 
stimulated private investment, small and medium-sized business, financial and capital 
markets, and human capital development and employment (3.1 trillion yen). Lastly, 
“Securing of Livelihood and Regional Vitalization” planned to ensure a sense of security 
in daily life and revitalize local areas through making use of their assets (3.1 trillion yen). 
Through these fiscal measures, the government expected economic impacts of a boost of 
2 percent in the real GDP growth rate and the creation of approximately 600,000 new 
jobs.52 Agile government expenditure reflected the strong intention of the cabinet to 
transform Japan’s depressed economic trends.  
Growth strategy was the final goal to complete Abe’s revitalization strategy plan on 
the supports of the monetary and fiscal policies. The cabinet introduced a new growth 
strategy on 14 June 2013. 53  The Japan Revitalization Strategy was based on three 
programs: the revitalization of industry, strategic market creation, and global outreach 
strategy. These plans proposed to strengthen the industrial base by structural reform and 
technological innovations; turning challenges into new markets by enhancing market 
structure such as agriculture, energy and next-generation infrastructure; and tapping into 
expanding global markets by expanding global participation such as Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and infrastructure export. Through the growth strategy, Abenomics 
aimed to restore the confidence of people and companies in their perception of the 
economy, and to induce their positive action beyond economic expectation. The Abe 
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administration ultimately declared that its objective of escaping from deflation and 
satisfying revitalization was to achieve “around 3% nominal gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth and around 2% real GDP growth, on average, over the next ten years.”54 The 
cabinet expected to enhance standards of living by increasing the per capita nominal Gross 
National Income (GNI) over 1.5 million yen in ten years.55 This was a basic concept of 
revitalization strategy and a roadmap to complete the third arrow, a growth strategy. 
 
Figure 1.  Three Arrows for Reviving the Japanese Economy56 
Bold economic policy was pragmatic for the second Abe administration. Abe 
learned a lesson from his political experience in the first administration: if the 
government is not concerned enough with enhancing the living standard of the public, 
this could be critical for regime stability. Abe saw that the main reason for failure in his 
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last administration was the low priority placed on the economic agenda.57 In fact, Abe 
perceived that he had great capability to handle foreign affairs in the first 
administration.58 Katz and Ennis stated that, having successfully handled diplomacy, Abe 
needed more proactive action to handle domestic affairs and economic achievement in 
order to recover the confidence of the Japanese people.59 
In addition, the economic status of Japan had worsened before Abe was back in 
office in 2012. The Japanese economy still did not escape from long deflation after Abe 
resigned as prime minister. For instance, the global financial crisis in 2008–2009 
confronted the Japanese with another economic challenge. In 2008, the Nikkei 225, the 
Nikkei Stock Average, declined over 40 percent, which caused a year-on-year decline of 
the GDP by almost 4 percent in the first quarter of 2009.60 Furthermore, on 11 March 
2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred even before the economic hardship of 
the global financial crisis had fully subsided. The Great Earthquake, accompanied by a 
large tsunami, damaged the Japanese people economically and psychologically. Japan’s 
real GDP fell 2 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2011.61 A number of people in 
the Northeastern region were suffering from having lost their economic living foundation. 
There seemed to be no hope for the Japanese people without a long-term master 
economic plan to escape deflation. 
Even though Abe grasped the second opportunity to serve as a Prime Minister by 
winning the 2012 general election, an image of the failure in the last administration might 
have been left among the public. Thus, Abe needed political momentum to distinguish his 
new administration from the shadow of the first administration in order to recover his 
political image. Abenomics was one of the most appropriate options for Abe and the 
public. As the ruling DPJ leaders of the former administration showed incapacity in 
dealing with natural disaster, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, and governing 
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domestic affairs, the Japanese public wanted strong leadership with concrete policies. 
With a new and strong economic policy, unlike the first administration, Abe could live up 
to the Japanese public’s expectation in the beginning of his second tenure as prime 
minister. Considering these factors, Abe stood to gain from creating political momentum 
in the new administration by setting Abenomics as a top priority.  
b. Economic Achievements and weaknesses of Abenomics 
Initial economic outcomes of the two arrows, aggressive monetary and flexible 
fiscal policies, demonstrated how Abenomics positively influenced the market. In the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Country Report in August 2013 for Japan, positive 
economic signals were shown in the first half of 2013:  
From September 2012 to mid-May 2013, the Nikkei rose by about 80 
percent, with large gains for export-oriented firms and financial 
institutions. The rise in the stock market occurred in tandem with the 
strong depreciation of the yen (down 17 percent in real effective terms 
between end-December 2012 and end-June 2013)…First quarter GDP 
growth jumped to 4.1 percent (SAAR) after two quarters of 
stagnation…These generally positive developments were confirmed in 
May through a further rise in industrial production (2 percent m/m) and 
retail sales (1.5 percent m/m)…Prices have been rising for three months 
on a sequential basis…is consistent with the increase in long-term 
inflation expectations...Inflation is projected to gradually increase to 0.7 
percent by end-2013 as growth improves, inflation expectations rise...(4) 
Business conditions have continued to improve as indicated by the second-
quarter Tankan Survey results released on July 1. Growth in 2013 is 
projected at 2 percent, mainly as a result of the new fiscal stimulus and 
monetary easing feeding through to private consumption and with some 
lag to investment...In 2014, growth is expected to moderate to 1.2 
percent.62  
In this sense, stable stock market and export industries accelerated sharp growth. 
Positive outlooks for the near-term economic prospects improved inflation expectation. 
In particular, inflation expectations were crucial for Abenomics to adopt a new 
framework for Japan’s economy and to achieve the government’s goal of 2 percent real 
GDP growth and 2 percent inflation target. The combination of monetary and fiscal 
                                                 
62 “Japan,” IMF Country Report No. 13/253, August 2013, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13253.pdf.  
 25 
policy, which were driven by the BOJ’s quantitative and qualitative easing and by the 
bold governmental fiscal stimulus, helped the market to understand that Abenomics could 
change prevailing deflation trends with its long-term policy. 
An expectation of new economic trends towards revitalization resulting from the 
initial outcomes of Abenomics was reflected in the Upper House election. The ruling 
coalition, the LDP and the New Komeito, won 76 seats out of 121 contested in the Upper 
House elections on 21 July 2013; they gained a majority by securing 135 of the 242 seats 
of the Upper House chamber. According to a survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun right 
before the election, 86 percent of the people regarded the economy and employment 
issues as the most important concerns for the election.63 These concerns of the public 
were decisively coincident with the economic agenda of the cabinet, which was the top 
priority policy. As a result, the second Abe administration finally achieved a majority in 
both houses and created a foundation of political stability. By securing full control of 
both houses, the cabinet became more comfortable managing domestic affairs in diverse 
fields. With Abe still enjoying above-50 percent approval ratings at this point, the 
Japanese people signaled to push forward with Abenomics. Abe also gained strong 
political momentum with this public confidence. An expectation of economic revival was 
translated into support of the Abe administration, and Abe made a foundation for firm 
domestic political stability. 
                                                 




Figure 2.  Japanese Economic Development and Outlook, August 201364 
 
                                                 




Figure 3.  Japanese Inflation and Monetary Policy, August 201365 
                                                 
65 Source: IMF Country Report No. 13/253, August 2013, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13253.pdf. 
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Although Abenomics played a significant role in ensuring Abe’s political 
stability, the prospect for Abenomics was not wholly positive. In April 2014, the cabinet 
decided to increase the consumption tax rate from five percent to eight percent. Paul 
Krugman, a Nobel prize laureate in economics, expressed pessimistic views about 
Japan’s April tax increase in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.66  Since he 
regarded creating inflation expectations by quantitative easing as a key factor to extricate 
Japan from deflation from 1998, Krugman worried about Tokyo’s decision as an example 
of bad timing. 67  Krugman questioned Japan’s economic recovery because the tax 
increase was not helpful to the Japanese economic revitalization, but a shift to economic 
recession was more likely.68 Krugman’s concern was realized soon after the consumption 
tax increase through the Japan’s economic quarterly real growth index. As shown in 
Table 1, after the cabinet’s decision was applied in the market, the overall economic 
index turned down.  
Table 1.   Economic Index Back and Forth after Abenomics and the 
Consumption Tax Increase69 
 2012 2013 2014 
3QT 4QT 1QT 2QT 3QT 4QT 1QT 2QT 3QT 
Before 
Abenomics 
The first year of 
Abenomics 




-0.5 -0.2 1.5 0.7 0.4 -0.4 1.4 -1.7 -0.5 
Household  
Consumption 
-0.4 0.1 1.3 0.8 0.3 -0.1 2.2 -5.2 0.4 
Business 
Investment 
-1.2 -0.6 -0.9 2.5 0.5 1.0 6.2 -4.7 -0.4 
Public 
Investment 
-3.3 -0.1 4.6 3.1 5.1 1.6 -2.7 0.9 1.4 
                                                 
66 John D’Amico, “Krugman Warns Abe on Tax Increase,” The Wall Street Journal, 19 September 
2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/09/19/krugman-warns-abe-on-tax-increase/.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 “Abenomics, Two Years: Achievements and Outlooks,” Global Market Report 15-007, Korea 
Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), January 2015. 
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Abe seemed to face a dilemma. On one hand, he need to increase taxes to prepare 
resources to continue the huge fiscal policy for Abenomics while, at the same time, 
improving Japan’s financial transparency. On the other hand, the consumption tax-rise 
had a negative influence in the market. This sales tax-rise issue is also unpopular because 
the most Japanese regard it as additional burden on their living standard. Ultimately, Abe 
chose the latter by declaring a postponement of the consumption tax increase. For Abe, 
the decision seemed reasonable because he promised Japan economic revitalization and 
regards this as a top priority policy of the cabinet. As stated above, however, increased 
national debt could hurt his government by damaging financial transparency. It still does 
not seem to produce favorable fruits from economic reform, his third arrow. Therefore, 
the further improved outcome of Abenomics and financial transparency of the 
government might significantly buoy the Abe cabinet in the long run. 
C. ELECTION TACTICS 
It is hard to directly compare the electoral tactics of Abe’s two tenures because, 
while Abe resigned soon after the 2007 Upper House election in his first administration, 
he held three elections in his second administration. Additionally, electoral campaign 
issues that Abe raised were considerably different between the tenures. In particular, in 
the second term, Abe demonstrated that an economic agenda was his central campaign 
issue even after he had established political stability by achieving a majority in elections 
of both houses. In April 2014, the cabinet had implemented the consumption tax increase, 
whose success proved dubious. Abe then strategically strengthened his political position, 
however, and regained credibility through calling for a snap election of the 2014 
December Lower House. This section will briefly review the major features of elections 
between the first and second tenures and explore how Abe’s election tactics, especially in 
his second tenure, influenced domestic politics and policy dynamics. 
1. Abe’s First Tenure  
The main difference between the two Abe administrations were the main 
campaign issues Abe tried to promote to the public. In Abe’s first term, a constitutional 
revision agenda was the central issue of the election. In the 2007 Upper House election in 
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July, Abe’s main campaign slogan was the Beautiful Country, which was that Abe raised 
ideological and political issues such as transforming the JSDF into a normal military. In 
the election, however, the issues that Abe raised could not lead voters’ concerns; people 
had paid most attention to the pension issue and scandals of the cabinet itself, as 
mentioned in an earlier section. Meanwhile, the DPJ condemned Abe’s being out of 
touch with the concerns of people’s daily lives, and carried the voters’ mind with the 
slogan of Putting People’s Lives First. Some analysts emphasized that the Japanese 
public was not accustomed to the nationalist agenda that Abe raised.70 Considering this, 
the Japanese people had seemed more concerned with butter issues than gun issues. 
Consequently, the 2007 Upper House election damaged the first Abe administration 
severely, allowing the DPJ to take a majority in the House of Councilors for the first time 
in history. Soon after, Abe announced his resignation. 
2. Abe’s Second Tenure 
Unlike the first tenure, Abe brought economic issues into focus both in the 
election campaign and during the second term. In the general election in December 2012, 
Abe appealed to the Japanese people to promise economic revival by shouting a slogan of 
Take Back Japan. It was the exact same strategy that the DPJ followed in the 2007 Upper 
House election. During the DPJ rule of 2009–2012, Japan continued to experience 
economic stagnation, and people were psychologically more shaken by the factor of the 
Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, Noda, the last prime minister of the DPJ, 
sought public support for his decision to increase the consumption tax regardless of the 
situation. Abe’s economics-focused strategy in the election led to a huge victory as the 
LDP held 294 of the chamber’s 480 seats. After the election, Abe held enough power to 
override a denial of the Upper House by the coalition party, with the New Komeito 
securing a super majority (above a two-thirds majority) in the Lower House. Abe 
continued to focus his concern on economic revitalization by promoting Abenomics. 
Abenomics was significant to Abe’s aim of securing a majority in the Upper House in the 
July 2013 election because the DPJ still had maintained a majority in the Upper House. If 
                                                 
70 Michael J. Green, “US-Japan Relations: Fukuda Takes the Helm,” Comparative Connections 9.3 
(October 2007). 
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Abe failed to secure a majority in the Upper House, the DPJ could make political 
gridlock and cause political instability for the regime. As stated in the earlier chapter on 
economic aspects, the initial success of Abenomics was critical for winning the Upper 
House election, and Abe finally obtained political stability in both houses. Although the 
coalition government failed to win a super majority this time, they maintained a majority 
in the Upper House by securing 135 of the 242 seats in the chamber. Abe politically 
became more comfortable because he could carry out his policy with the confidence of 
expecting an easy approach to the legislative proceedings. 
These economy-centered campaign tactics continued to prevail in successive 
elections. Every slogan of the elections in Abe’s second term had been adjusted to the 
economic revival, as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Election Campaign Slogans between the Two Abe Administrations71 
Elections Campaign slogans Note 
2007 Upper House Beautiful country First tenure 
2012 Lower House Take back Japan Second tenure 
2013 Upper House Recover, Japan  
2014 Lower House For economic recovery, this is the only path Snap election 
2016 Upper House Forward with strength this path  
 
Since the ruling coalition party secured a majority in both houses in the 2013 Upper 
House election, with the 2014 Lower House election slogan of For Economic Recovery, 
This Is The Only Path or the 2016 Upper House election slogan of Forward With 
Strength This Path, Abe continuously appealed to the economic issues mainly during the 
election periods. This trend seemed natural since the economic agenda was a top priority 
                                                 
71 Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, “kouyaku kanren” [About Pledges], accessed 17 November 
2016, https://www.jimin.jp/policy/manifest/.  
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in the second Abe administration, but it also started to show Abe’s separate strategy 
between election tactics and pursuing his security goals as policy itself. In July 2014, Abe 
announced a cabinet decision of developing new security legislation and revealed his 
hope to discuss the right of collective self-defense. 72  This announcement was a 
conspicuous agenda change raised by the prime minister from economy to security in the 
second Abe administration. In relative terms, however, Abe did not raise a strong voice 
for the security agenda, and he changed his attitude to focus more on the economic 
agenda during election periods. In the first administration, Abe directly raised 
constitutional amendment discourse as a central campaign issue and tried to be evaluated 
by the Japanese people through the election. Meanwhile, Abe preferred explaining 
governmental perspective toward security discourse more proactively to raising those 
issues directly in the election during the second tenure. Katsuya Okada, the DPJ leader, 
argued that the economy was not a real concern for Abe, but just misdirection: “during 
the campaign, Prime Minister Abe has not mentioned amendment of the Constitution. 
This is a stealth approach.”73 In the elections of his second tenure, unlike his first tenure, 
Abe was not emphasizing constitutional amendment and defense policy issues. Rather, 
Abe shifted his image to the public as a leader who pursued economic revitalization and 
promoted economic reform continuously in the elections.  
Abe’s unique election tactics were dramatically highlighted through the snap 
election in 2014. The Japanese Diet consists of two Houses of Representatives, the Upper 
House and the Lower House. The Houses of Representatives are elected through the 
periodic elections. The Lower House election, usually known as the general election, 
occurs every four years while the Upper House election occurs every three years and 
changes half of the Upper House representatives in every election. A prime minister is 
selected from the majority party of the Lower House. That means citizens choose a prime 
minister indirectly. Simply put, there are two steps in electing the executive. Citizens 
elect legislators at first, then legislators choose their prime minister. Traditionally, within 
                                                 
72 Abe, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” (speech, the press conference, 1 July 
2014), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0701kaiken.html.  
73 Linda Sieg, “Japan Ruling Bloc Election Win Could Be Too Big for Markets to Swallow,” Reuters, 
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the LDP, its president has served as a prime minister. The cabinet is established by the 
prime minister nominating the cabinet members. The relations between the cabinet and 
parliament is more dynamic due to the snap election mechanism of the parliamentary 
system. The cabinet and parliament have to satisfy each other; each one, however, can 
also fire the other at any time. A prime minister can decide to call for elections according 
to his political strategy while a parliament can also pass a vote of no-confidence in the 
cabinet. When a prime minister decides to call for a snap election, he or she accepts a 
political risk resulting from the outcome of that election. On the one hand, a prime 
minister could lose his or her position if credibility is lost through the election results. In 
the more serious case, if it loses the majority to the opposition party, the existing ruling 
party should accept a regime change. For example, Prime Minister Noda decided on a 
snap election in 2012 and the DPJ lost outright. Ironically, that snap election provided 
Abe with his return to power. On the other hand, Noda could have renewed confidence in 
his party presidency and prime ministership if he had won the election. Thus, the snap 
election is like a political gamble to a prime minister. 
Abe wanted to continue his economic policy and change the negative political 
mood from the consumption tax rise by the snap election in December 2014 instead of 
the pre-scheduled Lower House election in 2016. In the press conference on 11 
November 2014, Abe announced that he made a decision to postpone an original plan of 
the consumption tax-rate increase from 8 percent to 10 percent in October 2015 until 18 
months later, in April 2017. 74  This decision was deeply connected to the negative 
economic growth since the cabinet had recently raised the consumption tax rate from five 
percent to eight percent in April 2014.75 Abe confessed that a recent economic index 
failed to return to a growth track following the consumption tax rise by releasing the third 
quarter estimate of GDP.76 Abe concluded that the main reason for this recession was 
raising the sales tax rate. Ultimately, Abe regarded the consumption tax increase as a key 
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element to prevent Abenomics from achieving an economic revival. As review of the 
initial outcome of Abenomics in previous section showed, Abenomics continued to pose 
positive economic results from the beginning of the second Abe administration. 
Therefore, Abe had to consider that raising  the consumption tax rate further would bring 
a fatal outcome to Abenomics. For these reasons, Abe wanted to delay the sales tax and 
ask the people for their opinion on changing his original pledge of the consumption tax 
rate.  
The snap election reflected the underlying political calculations of the Abe 
administration. Even though Abe called for the dissolution of parliament due to the 
reason of the consumption tax issue, in fact, he asked people for their re-approval of 
Abenomics. Although people started to question Abenomics from the time of the first tax 
increase, Abenomics had politically significant meaning for Abe because Abenomics was 
an engine to lead Abe’s political revival at home and create a decisive source of 
development of Japan’s economic power in the world as well. If Abe won the snap 
election, he could acquire enough political legitimacy to push through Abenomics by 
eliminating criticism of the program. By doing so, Abe could reinitiate political stability 
and push his economic policy again.77 
Also, Abe calculated that he was not at risk to lose the snap election. Since eight 
percent of the consumption tax applied in the last April, the majority of the public reacted 
negatively to the second sales tax increase in October 2015, and these public voices have 
gradually increased as time goes by. In a survey in November 2014 conducted before the 
snap election, public opinion was reflected as follows: 47 percent of the people supported 
Abe’s decision to postpone the consumption tax increase while 40 percent of the people 
opposed it. Regarding the consumption tax increase itself, 40 percent of the people 
responded that the ten percent tax increase should be delayed until April 2017 and 39 
percent of the people responded that it should be abrogated, while only 14 percent of the 
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people responded that the tax increase should move ahead on schedule.78 As shown in the 
poll, almost 80 percent of people opposed the planned sales tax increase, and almost half 
of the public agreed with Abe’s policy. Considering the public’s concern toward the 
additional sales tax increase, it could be inferred that the possibility of losing the snap 
election of the ruling coalition party was relatively low. Therefore, through the snap 
election, Abe would renew the motivation of Abenomics by the mandate of the Japanese 
public with relatively low possibility of political risk. 
In addition, on the premise of gaining confidence through winning the snap 
election, Abe could enjoy short- and long-term benefits. As a short-term benefit, Abe 
could take the advantageous position first among competitors in the coming president 
election of the LDP in 2015. Since Abe had been president of the LDP from 2012, he 
reached the end of the three-year term in late 2015. In order to continue his term in office 
as prime minister, Abe needed to be reelected as president of the LDP. If he maintained a 
majority in the Lower House election, Abe could continue to serve as LDP president 
because of his mandate from the people. It is hard to imagine politicians within the LDP 
running against a prime minister who is supported by the majority. By winning the snap 
election, Abe could deepen and expand his influence within the LDP. 
Conversely, if Abe had not called for the snap election in 2014 and the economic 
situation worsened, it could have been a less favorable situation for him in facing the 
2015 president election in the LDP because he would have lost ground as a prime 
minister. Furthermore, this would be a worst-case scenario for both Abe and the LDP—
whatever the result of Abe’s reelection as party president—because this could potentially 
indicate a decline of the ruling power. To both Abe and a new prime minister, depending 
on the result of the president election within the LDP, political decline potential would 
have a huge burden on the 2016 general election ahead. Thus, under the conviction that 
the Abe administration would have a victory in the election, it was clear that the decision 
to proceed with the snap election was politically calculated to help both Abe and the 
LDP. 
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As a long-term political benefit, Abe would be able to create a foundation of 
political stability to discuss normalization discourse until his end of official tenure. If Abe 
had succeeded in both snap elections, he would have had the benefit of political comfort 
because there would have been no Lower House election, delaying the opportunity for the 
opposition party to take power, until 2018. As stated above, since there was a high 
possibility that a success of the snap election would ensure Abe’s duty as president of the 
LDP, Abe could continue to secure his term in office in 2018. This would have 
significant implications to normalization trajectory in two dimensions.  
First, Abe would create an opportunity to push the Collective Self Defense Right 
agenda. Since Abe achieved political stability by securing a majority in both houses, he 
gradually moved his agenda from economic issues to security issues. In particular, Abe 
tried to raise the necessity of the Collective Self Defense Right to shape a better security 
environment through direct and indirect channels. A negative economic status following 
the consumption tax increase, however, made domestic concern return to the economic 
issues, and Abe finally could not help deciding the snap election. Still, the Japanese 
public was not friendly to the government’s normalization approach; therefore, it is 
important to create a favorable domestic environment to deepen Abe’s security agenda 
again. This environment also would help to develop discourse on the Constitution 
amendment of Article 9. Probably, Abe looked forward to reinitiate his security agenda 
through a victory in the snap election in his political calculation. 
Second, Abe would gain enough time to focus on devoting all his energy to the 
Upper House election in 2016. On the premise of the LDP reassuring a majority in the 
snap election, Abe could earn almost two years of freedom with political legitimacy. 
During this time, Abe would accelerate a concrete election strategy toward the Upper 
House election. Although Abe secured a majority in the last 2013 Upper House election, 
he failed to gain a two thirds majority. To achieving the super majority is significant for 
Abe because the two thirds majority is a necessary condition to revising the Constitution. 
Practically, securing the super majority of the 2016 Upper House election could be the 
last chance for Abe to amend Article 9 in his official term. Thus, securing the super 
majority of the House of Councilors is vital to the process of legislating a revised 
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constitution bill smoothly. Considering Abe’s political calculation to the roadmap toward 
normalization, it could be possible to observe that Abe made his bid for victory to 
normalization trajectory through the snap election. 
As the result of the snap election carried out on 14 December 2014, Abe enjoyed 
political benefits. The coalition of the LDP and New Komeito achieved a huge win to 
mark a two thirds majority. The ruling coalition party secured 326 of 475 seats in the 
Lower House election. By winning the gamble, Abe gathered diverse political 
advantages. Above all, he regained political stability with the confidence and overcame 
criticism through the snap election. Abe could consolidate his position within the LDP as 
well as his presidency. In the 2015 president election of the LDP, no one stood as a 
candidate for the election. Naturally, Abe’s role of the president of the LDP continued to 
extend until 2018, and thus his role as prime minister as well. This political strength was 
beyond a check and balance from the opposition party. As a result, Abe achieved a super 
majority in the 2016 Upper House election in July, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Election Results in the Second Abe administration79 
 
Elections Results (the coalition ruling party*) Note 
2012 Lower House securing 325 of 480 seats in the chamber Super majority** 
2013 Upper House securing 135 of 242 seats in the chamber The majority 
2014 Lower House securing 326 of 475 seats in the chamber Super majority 
2016 Upper House securing 146 of 242 seats in the chamber Super majority 
*Seats of the coalition ruling party is the sum total of seats secured by the LDP and New 
Komeito. 
**Super majority means securing more than two thirds of the total seats of a house. 
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With this, Abe could satisfy the minimum condition to raise constitutional 
revision in accordance with procedures and methods determined by law by securing super 
majorities in both houses. Relevant particulars related to this will be dealt with in the 
following chapter. Also, Abe ensured the legitimacy to push Abenomics again by 
securing a mandate from the public. With this, Abe could strongly continue to drive 
economic policy through his three arrows. This meant Abe continued to look forward to 
exploiting his economic narrative in various parts of politics.  
The victory of the 2014 snap election, however, did not necessarily indicate only 
positive aspects of the second Abe administration. According to the poll conducted by 
Yomiuri Shimbun, the main reason to choose the ruling party, at 65 percent, was that the 
LDP was relatively more attractive than the other opposition parties; only 7 percent of the 
people, however, responded that they choose the LDP due to support for Abenomics.80 
This survey revealed two implications that might be potential weak points for the Abe 
administration. First, it can be inferred that the real reason the Japanese people gave a 
mandate to the ruling party was that the opposition party was weak and not credible, 
rather than the public’s judgment being driven by the good governance of the Abe 
administration itself. It can be also inferred that the Japanese people probably did not 
have high hopes for Abenomics. The reason why they chose to keep the current cabinet 
might be that they saw no economic alternatives to Abenomics because the government 
already had invested enormous capital in its long-term planning. That means that success 
or failure of Abenomics could be a significant indicator for the Abe administration in the 
future. More important, however, was that Abe obtained a superficially strong domestic 
mandate to execute his presidency despite these concerns, and it seemed that there were 
no severe competitors to threaten Abe’s administration. 
Abe achieved a huge success in multiple elections during his second tenure. He 
knew that, in the election, the main issue of the public was economic well-being because 
he had learned a lesson from the experience of his first administration. Therefore, unlike 
his first administration, Abe separated political strategy from policy regarding 
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ideological, defense and security issues such as constitutional amendment and the right of 
collective self-defense as an election agenda. Abe thoroughly focused on his economic 
agenda as an election tactic and pursued his security issues as policy only. Consequently, 
Abe’s crucial decision to dismiss parliament and call for the snap election was an 
accurate political calculation. This political decision was significant in creating an 
opportunity to consolidate his reputation in the domestic power dynamics, both within the 
LDP and in the wider party politics. 
D. SECURITY POLICY 
During his first term in office, historic issues and the nuclear crisis provoked by 
North Korea were dominant concerns for the Abe administration. Both issues gave Abe 
challenges and opportunities. In his second term in office, restoration of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, which was at a low point during the DPJ administration, was a top priority for 
national security. Unlike the first tenure, greater security concern about rising China and 
North Korea prevented enhancing the relationships with those nations; Abe’s softened 
historic perspective about the comfort women issue, however, was able to shed a new 
light on the trilateral relations with the United States and South Korea. Meanwhile, 
through both tenures, Abe attached importance to the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to 
pursue proactive diplomacy. The key feature that shows the difference between the two 
tenures is that Abe was substantially able to specify his security roadmap one by one by 
accomplishing several security bills during his second tenure.   
1. Abe’s First Tenure 
On 15 August 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which 
memorialized the names of Class-A war criminals of the Second World War period. 
Koizumi visited Yasukuni after he became prime minister, but obviously Koizumi’s first 
visit on August 15 shocked China and South Korea. For those countries, August 15 is the 
anniversary of independence. John Ikenberry condemned Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit by 
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criticizing Japan’s “history problem” that still caused China and South Korea suspicion 
and unhappiness.81  
On the security side, North Korea was considered a higher priority than other 
issues in the first Abe administration. Two months before Abe was elected prime 
minister, seven missiles were launched by North Korea near the coast of Japan, including 
a long-range missile known as Taepodong-2 on 5 July 2006.82 More surprisingly, despite 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemnation of its behavior, North Korea 
conducted a nuclear test for the first time in its history on 9 October 2006. This nuclear 
crisis was one of the highest security concerns for Tokyo after the end of the Cold War. 
North Korea’s nuclear issue provided Japan with both challenges and 
opportunities. Japan regarded the nuclear test as a significant threat. Abe proceeded to 
strengthen security cooperation with neighboring countries. In particular, Abe and 
President George Bush reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan alliance by dealing with the nuclear 
crisis, and cooperated with each other on several issues such as missile defense, U.S. 
forces in Okinawa, and Tokyo’s reconciliation with neighbors, especially China and 
South Korea, related to historical issues. 
The nuclear crisis also put pressure on Japan to create an incentive to build 
relations with China and South Korea. On 8 October 2006, Abe visited China. Tokyo and 
Beijing agreed to restrain the North Korean nuclear program at the summit between Abe 
and Hu Jintao, the Chinese President. In addition, the two countries agreed to cooperation 
in conflicts over natural resources around the East China Sea through a Japan-China 
security dialogue. Both sides relieved tension resulting from Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni 
on 15 August.83  
On 9 October 2006, Abe travelled to Seoul to meet Roh Moo-hyun, the South 
Korean President. Because the summit was held after an announcement of the nuclear test 
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by North Korea, both sides had no choice but to focus on the conversation dealing with 
this challenge rather than historical issues like the Yasukuni visit and the Dokdo 
(Takeshima) issue.84 Through a joint statement, Seoul and Tokyo agreed on two major 
themes. One was that both counties could not tolerate North Korea’s behavior, 
condemning it as “a grave threat.” Another was that Seoul and Tokyo agreed to start 
“joint research on history” and make an effort to promote the bilateral relationship with a 
mind “toward the future.”85  
During his first tenure, Abe also showed his will to coordinate with China and 
South Korea by not visiting Yasukuni officially. Ironically, the crisis from the North 
Korean nuclear test opened the door for Tokyo to increase ties with China and South 
Korea. Abe also pursued expanding political and economic ties with Southeast Asian 
countries and upgrading the strategic relationship with India. Internally, he tried to let 
kantei have a major effect on both defense and crisis management by establishing the 
National Security Council (NSC) and upgrading the Japan Defense Agency to Ministry of 
Defense status in 2007. 
2. Abe’s Second Tenure 
In Abe’s second administration, restoring the U.S.-Japan alliance was the main 
security issue. From a conservationist perspective, during the DPJ rule from 2009 to 
2012, the U.S.-Japan alliance showed worse coordination than ever before. For example, 
over three years of DPJ rule, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko was the only prime minister 
to visit Washington officially.86 Abe wanted the U.S.-Japan alliance back in place.  
Abe has strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance more strongly than ever and put the 
U.S.-Japan alliance as the top priority in his security policy; the alliance is the main axis 
the LDP pursues as a foreign policy with Abe’s slogan, “proactive pacifism.” Abe 
declared his foreign policy priorities as follows: (1) revitalizing the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
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(2) increasing the defense budget and establishing the right of collective self-defense, and 
(3) communication on energy policy, including nuclear safety.87 Abe regarded the U.S.-
Japan alliance as a “cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy.”88 In both the first and second 
Abe administrations, Abe attached importance to the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
Unlike Abe’s first administration efforts to build relations with Asian neighbors, 
current relations with China and South Korea are often blocked due to Abe’s bold speech 
and behavior based on history revisionism. Including historical issues such as Abe’s visit 
to Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, a controversial history textbook, comfort women issues and, 
especially, territorial disputes over the Senkaku and Dokdo (Takeshima) Islands, Japan 
looks likely to pursue physical confrontation rather than diplomatic negotiations. 
In particular, rising China and its military build-up became a factor for the current 
administration to attend to security with more concern than before. The tension between 
China and Japan seemed more severe after China surpassed Japan in economic growth in 
2010. Beijing and Tokyo deepened tension around the Senkaku Islands in 2010 and 2012 
due to the Noda administration’s purchasing of the Senkaku Islands. On 23 November 
2013, China declared the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Soon 
after China’s declaration of ADIZ, Japanese public opinion towards China got worse. 
According to the survey, 87 percent of Japanese felt relations between the two countries 
were not ideal; China was regarded as a military threat by 78 percent of the public.89 
Maritime security around the Southeast China Sea still holds the potential for regional 
conflicts. 
In this sense, Japan had to look forward to reducing its security concerns by 
intensifying the U.S.-Japan alliance. The 2008 Obama Asian rebalancing strategy known 
as the “Pivot to Asia” also made more room to increase Japanese defense capabilities. 
Usually, the United States does not take a position on sovereignty issues for other 
countries. It did, however, make a decision to defend Japan’s territory, including the 
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Senkakus, under the terms of an Article of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.90 The 
Diplomat also reported, “Barack Obama, for the first time, took a side on the Senkaku 
dispute, backing Japan.”91 Under the U.S.-Japan alliance, Abe completed an additional 
amendment for the new defense guidelines in the direction of intensifying support of the 
United States. In addition, finally, Abe completed legislation about Collective Self-
Defense with the United States at his back. The Abe administration’s bold moves along a 
normalization trajectory would proceed within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
In Japan’s relations with the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s provocations 
became more severe than in Abe’s first tenure. Kim Jong-un became a new leader, and he 
seemed successfully to consolidate his power within the regime. Under Kim’s regime, 
North Korea conducted bolder military provocations. Several nuclear tests and 
development of diverse ballistic missile capability directly threatened Japan and other 
regional states. Abe countered North Korea’s actions by imposing unilateral economic 
sanctions and actively participating in the resolutions provided by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). In addition, Abe tried to strengthen internal balancing to these 
military threats by amending security bills. Meanwhile, it was surprising that Japan and 
Korea reached an agreement on “comfort women” on 28 December 2015. Abe’s sincerity 
toward the agreement, however, remained in doubt when he later took the opposite stance 
to the agreement by saying, “There was no evidence showing that the women were 
forcibly mobilized.”92 Nonetheless, the comfort women agreement with South Korea in 
December 2015 had positive effects on the international society as well as appealing to 
the Japanese. Japan is looking forward to strengthening regional cooperation against any 
provocation by North Korea through the trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK relations. 
Considering this security environment stated above, unlike in his first tenure, 
most importantly Abe accomplished several institutional changes in the security domain. 
These achievements involved fundamentally changed security contents. Abe established 
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the National Security Council (NSC) (which is directly subordinate to his office), 
published a National Security Strategy (NSS), launched the State Secrecy Law, and 
approved the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) base in Okinawa in 2013. 
Then, the Abe cabinet approved its defense equipment and technology transfers abroad 
by launching Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in 
2014. Finally, under the National Defense Programme Guidelines (NDPG) of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, Abe was successful in paving the way for use of forces overseas by 
passing the collective self-defense right in 2015. More specific details about how Abe has 
accomplished these achievements will be examined in the following chapters. 
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III. ABE’S PRAGMATISM 
In an earlier chapter, we discussed what happened in both of Abe’s tenures and 
discovered major differences between the two Abe administrations when comparing 
agenda setting, economic policy, election tactics, and security policy. During both 
tenures, Abe continued to try to pave the way for his specific visions and belief about the 
normalization trajectory for a “beautiful country.” Between the two tenures, however, 
Abe showed considerably different approaches to obtaining his goals. The political 
outcomes that followed were also different. In particular, Abe’s pragmatic approach was 
a central element leading to better success in his second administration than his first. 
Abe’s pragmatism established political stability by managing his political capital and 
creating an environment conducive to security discourse. This chapter explores how 
Abe’s pragmatism bring about Abe’s political success. 
A. ABE’S PRAGMATISM AND HIS POLITICAL CAPITAL 
Many changes of the second Abe administration have been attributed to Abe’s 
pragmatic approach to statecraft. In the first tenure, Abe had promoted his aggressive 
national security agenda straightforwardly to the Japanese public, who was unfamiliar 
with it. As a result, he quickly lost political capital, without an opportunity to recover. In 
his second tenure, however, Abe managed political assets by watching the trend of public 
opinion and using this trend in elections. Abe’s election win and approval ratings helped 
him to both change the political agenda and recover a support base. Abe was also 
pragmatic in addressing national security issues, using a step-by-step approach to deepen 
the security discourse. Abe’s pragmatism was reflected in the changing Japanese political 
trends and his own political experiences. Abe’s political success in his second 
administration has been mostly influenced by both of these structural and individual 
factors. 
When the LDP only controlled the Lower House, Abe generally adjusted his 
approach based on the voters’ primary interest fields and focused on accumulating 
support bases. Abe demonstrated his pragmatism by improving his administration’s 
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approval ratings, which resulted in the LDP retaking the Upper House. In a democratic 
system, it is natural that results of election and approval ratings are significant for the 
political regime because a mandate from the majority ensures the winner’s political 
stability. Politically, an absolute control of both houses was vital and a primary objective 
for the new Abe administration. As discussed in the previous chapter, Abe’s election 
tactics stayed parallel to his economic agenda, the area of most interest to the Japanese 
people. This pragmatic approach resulted in Abe’s election formula, including a new 
economic promise and political flexibility in changing his pledge to his advantage right 
before the elections. Table 4 shows Abe’s election pledges in the elections. 
Table 4.   Abe’s Election Pledges93 
Elections  Abe’s election pledge  Political timing  
2013 Upper House  
(21 July) 
New growth strategy  
(14 June) 
Positive outcome of 
Abenomics 
2014 Lower House  
(14 December) 
Postpone the sales tax  
(first time, 11 November) 
 
2016 Upper House  
(10 July) 
Postpone the sales tax  
(second time, 1 June) 
Obama’s visit to Hiroshima,  
G7 summit (27 May) 
 
On 14 June 2013, Abe proposed a new growth strategy a month before the Upper 
House election in July, when the LDP was a minority in the Upper House.94 It was good 
timing because the economic mood was favorable to Abenomics, which had shown a 
positive signal of economic index in the first and second quarters in 2013. Abe met the 
people’s economic expectations by announcing a new economic growth strategy. He 
promised the public that he was planning to increase the per capita income of Japan by 
$15,000 during the next decade.95 Although it was obviously hard to verify whether this 
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new pledge could be realized in a month, its effectiveness was confirmed by Abe winning 
the election.  
More surprising was that Abe’s election formula continued after his ruling 
coalition had an ability to control both houses. For instance, as depicted in the election 
section, Abe called for a snap election in 2014 on the issue of the consumption tax 
increase. The public opinion was favorable to his decision, and Abe achieved a mandate 
from the public. When Abe called for the snap election due to the tax issue, he firmly 
promised no further delay of the consumption tax-rate raise in the future.96 Abe changed 
this political pledge once again, however, a month before the Upper House election. Abe 
announced at the press conference on 1 June 2016 that he decided to postpone the 
consumption tax increase from its origin schedule in April 2017 to October 2019.97 
Although he won the last election, this time Abe needed to overcome two additional 
obstacles: (1) the public questioned Abe’s credibility as a leader of the government by 
breaking his pledge, and (2) Abe faced the potential failure of Abenomics through a 
repetition of postponing the consumption tax increase.98 Abe actively answered those 
questions at the press conference by borrowing global leaders’ opinion as follows: 
“Emerging and developing economies are currently in a downturn and the global 
economy is facing large risks. I shared this recognition the other day with the world 
leaders who came together for the G7 Ise-Shima Summit.” 99  In particular, Abe 
emphasized the global summit’s assessment about the global economic situation; thus, his 
decision was not arbitrary. According to his announcement, therefore, he analyzed the 
economic trends and talked to the public frankly about managing the economic crisis.100 
Also, Abe explained that the tax delays have never meant the failure of Abenomics, but 
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only preparing the risk resulting from global economic downturn.101 Again, Abe wanted 
to ask the public again to support his new decision through the election.  
Abe’s success in ensuring a mandate from the election resulted from his 
pragmatic approach of arranging political events to his advantage. Abe’s decision of 
delaying the sales tax rise was announced soon after President Obama’s historical visit to 
Hiroshima, site of the first of two atomic bombs dropped on Japan in the Second World 
War. This political event represented a significant symbol of moving relations forward 
between the United States and Japan because Obama was the first president to visit the 
historical place since the Second World War. On 27 May 2016, when Obama visited 
Hiroshima, he was received with great enthusiasm by the Japanese people. An image of 
Obama embracing one of the atomic bomb victims was spread all around Japan through 
the media and touched the Japanese people.102 Meanwhile, Obama was not the only 
winner. Abe also enjoyed this benefit because he created a decisive diplomatic effort for 
President Obama to participate in the event. Obama’s visit had a marvelous effect for 
Abe in his approval rating. Abe marked 55.3 percent approval, an increase of 7 points 
since the previous month.103 Politically, Obama’s visit to Hiroshima was a perfect timing 
to counterbalance the sales tax rate increase ahead. Therefore, this series of political 
events Abe planned proceeded under Abe’s detailed political calculation, and this can be 
inferred to prove his pragmatism. 
The most important factor of Abe’s pragmatism was that he leaned on public 
opinion. Abe accepted public opinion again, just as he did in the last election in 2014. As 
the same pattern, he was confident of voters’ response based on the poll. According to the 
public opinion poll conducted by Kyodo, a month before the Upper House election, 70 
percent of people supported delaying the sales tax increase policy while 24 percent of 
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people disapproved of it.104 As a result, Abe’s success story continued by ensuring a 
mandate through the 2016 Upper House election. It was a huge victory to secure the 
super majority in the Upper House, retaining 146 seats in the 242-seat chamber. Once 
again, Abe created an opportunity to promote Abenomics. More importantly, Abe could 
take the advantageous position of leading national security issues by securing the super 
majority in both houses, a minimum condition for proceeding with a constitutional 
amendment. Unlike his first administration, Abe compromised with public opinion, 
especially before the elections. As a result, his flexibility led to his superior position in 
the election. This case showed how Abe became politically more flexible and how he 
dealt with public opinion to ensure political stability. 
B. THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL 
SECURITY POLICY 
Abe’s pragmatism led to domestic political stability and created a favorable 
foundation for his revision goals in the security and defense domain. Knowing this 
security part was more challenging, Abe continued the pragmatic approach in the national 
security area. With groundwork completed to create an environment conducive to  
developing his national security agenda, Abe also used a pragmatic approach to 
the security domain by applying a step-by-step approach in expanding his security 
discourse. In other words, Abe drove his hawkish policies, taking advantage of favorable 
political timing, and applied relatively modest policies to recover approval of the cabinet.  
The new confidence caused by winning several elections allowed him to switch to 
a national security agenda that he promoted in Japan and throughout Southeast Asia. On 
23 July, two days after a victory in the 2013 Upper House election, Abe visited Southeast 
Asia. Abe’s visit can be interpreted as a political message to highlight a new security 
agenda setting because this region has growing maritime security concerns. In 
cooperation with the United States, Japan tried to strengthen a relation with ASEAN 
countries in both the security and economic domains against rising China. After Abe 
returned to Japan, he revealed that he wanted to discuss the right to collective self-
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defense in the press conference.105 Also, Abe revealed that he would review the National 
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and institute the National Security Council (NSC) 
to examine the right of collective self-defense.106 In the second Abe administration, the 
timing and place he visited was a turning point to promote his national security agenda in 
earnest. 
This transition of political agenda from economy to security revealed that Abe 
would take concrete action on his national security policies soon. For example, after Abe 
returned from Southeast Asia in August, he unilaterally appointed Ichiro Komatsu as the 
Director-General of the cabinet legislation bureau, which determines how the cabinet 
should interpret the Japanese Constitution.107  Komatsu was known as a Constitution 
revisionist who favored Abe’s push for a normal military.108 In October, Abe suggested 
the State Secrecy Law, which enables the cabinet to determine defense information as a 
special secret. Although this law was controversial, it was approved by the national Diet 
on 6 December 2013. In this way, Abe exploited his prerogatives as a prime minister who 
possessed a strong advocacy—including the agenda setting, the appointive power, and 
political capability to control both houses—to ensure passage of the security legislation. 
This resulting power was possible from the political capital Abe achieved earlier. 
Abe skillfully connected political events to the security domain and took rapid 
political benefits from those events. After having renewed his mandate through the snap 
election in 2014, Abe decided to increase the 2015 defense budget. The cabinet approved 
a record high defense budget of $42 billion, rising 2 percent from the previous year.109 In 
succession, when two Japanese hostages were killed by armed members of the Islamic 
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State in February, Abe responded rapidly and sensitively by visiting the Middle East and 
promised humanitarian support to counter brutal terrorism. 110  Using the favorable 
attitude of public opinion and the press toward his decisions since the hostage incident, 
Abe tried to revise the law related to JSDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces) deployment and 
rescue operations. After the Japanese hostage incident, the approval ratings for the 
cabinet rose, and the debate over Abe’s demanding an active role for JSDF was 
intensified.111  
In addition to switching agendas, Abe also paid close attention to keeping his 
political capital when he developed a normalization trajectory process. Since Abe had 
suggested collective self-defense, this agenda gradually became a central issue in Japan. 
Exercising the right of collective self-defense was also one of the most significant 
security policies for Abe to achieve for Japan to be a normal state among the nations of 
the world. This is because collective self-defense causes a fundamental change in the 
Japanese security domain. In the current constitution established after WW2, it is denied 
the right to use armed forces. Collective self-defense, however, could allow using armed 
forces under certain conditions defined by the state and its ally. This became considerably 
controversial in Japanese society, dividing the country into pro and anti-camps, because a 
number of people in Japan still respected a national devotion to protect their pacifist 
constitution. Therefore, Abe needed a careful approach to pursue his security goals by 
minimizing political risk to his regime. 
Two main directions would enable the establishment of the collective self-
defense.112 The first is directly to amend the Article 9 of the Constitution known as the 
pacifist constitution, and the second is drawing up the new security legislation based on 
the constitutional reinterpretation recommended by the Cabinet Legal Bureau. Under this 
situation, on 1 July 2014, Abe announced that the cabinet made a decision to choose the 
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latter.113 The former included many potential risks in using Article 96, which were too 
heavy to lose political capital of the Abe administration: 
Article 96. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, 
through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of 
each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, 
which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast 
thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall 
specify. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated 
by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this 
Constitution.114 
It seemed unreasonable for Abe to use Article 96 because there were several 
limitations. Although he could control both houses comfortably, the Upper House did not 
secure a two-thirds majority. Also, the New Komeito, the coalition party of the LDP, 
opposed the amendment of Article 9.115 Importantly, there was no precedent to revise the 
Japanese Constitution since its enactment in 1947. Even though Abe had accumulated his 
political capital, and by doing so, established a favorable domestic political environment 
since 2012, executing Article 96 was a quite risky challenge. In the worst-case scenario, 
Abe would lose the engine of the regime for the next three years in office if the House of 
Representatives and the voters rejected the amendment. Therefore, the cabinet chose a 
more pragmatic way of a relatively possible scenario and preferred a lower risk action 
even though the amendment of Article 9 would have directly completed the 
normalization trajectory.  
Conversely, under the non-favorable political condition, Abe attempted to transfer 
the public’s concern to the relatively modest and practical economic area. On 16 July 
2015, when the security bills accompanied by a controversial collective self-defense right 
finally passed in the Lower House, Abe reached political crisis without precedent in his 
second term. A number of the Japanese people, including constitutional scholars, the 
opposition parties’ politicians, college students, and general citizens, protested against the 
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regime. On 14 July, a crowd of nearly 20,000 protesters gathered in Hibiya Park in Tokyo 
and expressed their opposition to the government’s security bills.116 At this point, Abe’s 
approval ratings were the lowest of his second tenure. According to the poll on 19 July, 
Abe’s disapproval ratings were higher than his approval ratings for the first time in the 
second term (36.1 percent of approval and 47.0 percent of disapproval).117 Almost all of 
the opposed people were unsatisfied with the cabinet’s insufficient explanation of the 
package of security bills. This protest continued for a while even after the security bills 
were passed as law by the Upper House on 19 September.  
Abe, then, immediately changed his agenda from security to the economic 
domain. In the beginning of October, Abe held press conferences for two consecutive 
days and appealed to the people to focus his and his cabinet’s energy on economy 
revitalization. On 6 October 2015, Abe announced an agreement on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and emphasized that Japan would have an unprecedented scale of 
economic zone, including nearly 40 percent of the huge global economy with 800 million 
people. 118  Abe asserted that TPP would provide Japan with a new opportunity for 
economic growth and a new engine for escaping from deflation; thus, the Japanese people 
should move forward on the new challenges. 119  The next day, on 7 October, Abe 
announced the upgraded Abenomics by presenting his “100 million Japanese citizens’ 
active roles” plan: 
I will fire my new “three arrows” forcefully, seeking to attain the three 
major targets of raising GDP to 600 trillion yen, our largest in the post-war 
era; raising the birthrate to 1.8 children per woman, which is the level the 
public has indicated as desirable; and eliminating cases in which people 
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have no choice but to leave their jobs to provide nursing care. I believe we 
have succeeded in preparing a robust structure for achieving this.120 
Abe suggested a strengthening supply-based economic policy for preventing an 
absence of labor forces and preparing long term social issues, including low birth rate and 
an aging society. Through the newer plan, Abe intended that Japan would be more 
productive by maintaining a population of 100 million even 50 years later and would 
achieve a sustainable economy. 
In order to resolve the current situation, Abe’s choice of economic-centric 
approach was successful in recovering his approval ratings. According to an Asahi poll 
about the cabinet, the lowest support rating around the security bills from July to 
September showed a reverse course in October (42.2 percent approval and 41.0 percent 
disapproval) and returned to a stable condition again in December (47.3 percent approval 
and 33.3 percent disapproval).121 Consequently, Abe’s economic card was successful to 
transcend the most severe political crisis in his second term. In order to fulfill both 
economic and security goals, the second Abe administration pursued a strategic and 
pragmatic approach in dealing with political choices. More sensitive security policy was 
applied when the political indicators showed relatively stable while economic policy was 
emphasized when the political condition was relatively unstable, all with the purpose of 
regaining credibility for the cabinet. Putting it differently, the second Abe administration 
showed a policy flexibility in choosing cabinet decisions based on the political indicators. 
C. ABE’S MOTIVATION FOR THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH 
Why did Abe adopt a new pragmatic approach? In his first tenure, Abe’s 
uncompromising political style did not stop him even in the face of declining approval 
ratings toward the cabinet. During the first tenure, Abe showed a tendency to fix his own 
philosophy. He described this idea well in his book by depicting the “fighting politician” 
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as the self-portrait he was aiming for.122 A fighting politician would struggle for his own 
belief and be unperturbed by any confrontation against this belief.123 Abe’s unique stance 
made it difficult for him to observe a public trend. According to Fujihira, Abe’s political 
style was closer to “top-down” (i.e., exerting his own preference) than “bottom-up” (i.e., 
persuading the people to the direction of his preference).124 In the 2007 Upper House 
election campaign, Abe proved to exert his own idea to the public. Having experiences of 
diverse scandals such as the government’s mishandling of national pensions and 
corruption of ministers in the cabinet, the disappointed Japanese people wanted the 
government to return its concern to the economy. Abe stimulated the public’s anxieties, 
however, by presenting a revision of the pacifist constitution as a main campaign slogan, 
stating: “to pursue reforms, to build a new country, I have to fulfill my duties as prime 
minister from now on as well.”125 Abe’s straightforward political stance implications 
combined with overconfidence about the LDP support led to a loss of political stability 
by exposing a gulf between Abe’s goals and public opinion. 
Conversely, a rapid but significant political success stood in stark contrast to 
political failure in his former term, and forced Abe to change his political style and adopt 
pragmatic ways in executing premiership in his second term. Although some people 
worried about his top-down political style when he was back, strategically, Abe chose a 
different approach from the past. This is because Abe had learned political lessons from 
the former and present experiences. Looking back on his political failure in the past, Abe 
confessed: “Nine years ago as Prime Minister I suffered a crushing defeat in the House of 
Councilors election that summer, after which I resigned my post as Prime Minister. The 
setback of that time is still deeply etched into my mind even now.”126 Abe kept his 
former failure in mind, and this experience made him politically careful. In his second 
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term, Abe did not justify his image as an unwavering conservative revisionist leaning 
only on a right-wing ideology.127 Abe tried to listen to more diverse voices of the public, 
instead of focusing on his own preferences. As Abe became politically mature, his 
political style also changed from uncompromising to more pragmatic. During the time he 
spent building up his political capital, Abe refined his approach, evolving and learning 
the benefits of flexibility and compromise. These changes were the central motivation to 
lead his relative success in his second tenure. Sometimes, it is rare and risky for a 
politician to change his own political style; however, Abe’s pragmatic approach was a 
good fit for the current situation of Japanese politics. 
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IV. DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
While Abe’s pragmatic political shift made him strong enough to build up his 
political capital for his premiership, his degree of success was also contingent on changes 
in the political environment. Favorable domestic political environments helped Abe’s 
political success. In this chapter, I will examine the elements that enabled Abe’s 
achievements in his second administration: the political influence of former 
administrations, Abe’s strong position within the LDP, weak opposition party, and 
economic downturn. 
A. POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF FORMER ADMINISTRATIONS 
Since electoral reform in the 1990s, the political structure in Japan had 
experienced a transition to reduce factional power within the LDP, and public approval 
had become more of a determining factor for political stability of the cabinet. As 
discussed earlier in the literature review, political factions were traditionally the crucial 
factor in selecting the LDP president, and a prime minister was more affected by support 
of these factions than by approval of the public.128 The electoral reform in the 1990s 
changed this political trend, however. In the 2000s in particular, the political legacy of 
the Koizumi administration had one of the most significant political impacts in 
weakening the role of factions in power dynamics within the LDP.129 Koizumi was able 
to create prime minister-centric political self-reliance on the basis of public approval and 
without factional political cooperation. As a result, he was able to survive power 
competition within the LDP. Michael J. Green depicted this change of power dynamics in 
Japanese politics before and after Koizumi as follows: “Before Koizumi, a Japanese 
prime minister could survive with relatively low public support by relying on the factions 
that put him in office in the first place. But Koizumi dealt a body blow to factions and 
made public polling a critical indicator of the political strength of the prime minister.”130 
                                                 
128 Mark Mohr, “Japan’s Political Mess: Abe Failed, Can Fukuda Do Better?” Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars Asia Program Special Report 139, (January 2008): 1–2. 
129 Pekkanen, “What Is Koizumi’s Legacy?” 5. 
130 Green, “US-Japan Relation: An Unexpected Rough Patch.” 
 58 
This legacy enabled prime ministers to have more political freedom from factions; at the 
same time, this meant a prime minister would conduct state affairs based upon an 
unstable political structure if he failed to prove his political leadership. With this political 
change, Kim and Park survey the correlation between approval rating of the cabinet and 
the terms of Prime Ministers: 
In the intra-party level, the power of party faction diminished in selecting 
Prime Minister. In the inter-party level, the number of voters of no party 
identification increased. Eventually, there was no solid mechanism of 
gaining voters in Japanese politics. Under the circumstance, the rate of 
voter’s support, especially for Prime Minister and his cabinet, began to 
matter. The rate repeatedly moved from high at the beginning of Prime 
Ministership to low because of whimsical voters’ preference. This 
eventually resulted in the remarkably unstable Prime Ministership, which 
interrupted and shortened the terms of Prime Ministership in Japan.131 
In reality, as shown in Table 5, many prime ministers who were damaged by low 
approval ratings of the cabinet did not complete their terms in office after Koizumi: 
Table 5.   Term of Prime Minister in Japan after 2000132 
Prime Minister Term Party Begin End 
Junichiro Koizumi 2001–2006 LDP 78% 46.9% 
Shinzo Abe 2006–2007 LDP 70.5% 24.3% 
Yasuo Fukuda 2007–2008 LDP 56.8% 33.9% 
Taro Aso 2008–2009 LDP 50.4% 21.5% 
Yukio Hatoyama 2009–2010 DPJ 72.4% 20.5% 
Naoto Kan 2010–2011 DPJ 58.7% 16.4% 
Yoshihiko Noda 2011–2012 DPJ 54.6% 19.4% 
Shinzo Abe 2012– LDP 62.4% 48.5% (Sep.) 
 
Between Koizumi and Abe’s second administration, six prime ministers were 
replaced, and their average term in office was just over one year. These short-term prime 
ministers had in common low approval ratings by the end of their term. The second Abe 
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administration, however, maintained generally strong approval ratings during over four 
years of his term in office, although there was a period of fluctuation. As stated above, 
Abe’s new pragmatic approach in the second administration was effective in maintaining 
stable approval rating by targeting the elections and public opinion. Abe has shown 
flexibility in applying policy and a respectful attitude to the public opinion rather than 
shaping a strong and uncompromising political image. Behind this, Abe’s skilled 
capabilities contributed to a detailed political calculation of interpreting political trends, 
capturing opportunities and timing, and applying his policies appropriately. As a result, 
these pragmatic characteristics were helpful to consolidate political stability of his second 
tenure. 
Since these changes to the role of factional power and relative increased prime 
minister’s leadership were already apparent under Koizumi, it is reasonable to ask why 
Abe did not apply strategic and pragmatic management in his first administration. The 
fact he did not can be attributed to different contexts of the political capital that Abe 
possessed when he took power.  
In the first administration, Abe had overconfidence in his high popularity with the 
public, mostly based on Koizumi’s political platform; therefore, Abe did not catch up 
with new political trends. At the start of his first tenure, Abe’s political platform was not 
poor. As Abe was a successor to Koizumi, he already held a strong position as a prime 
minister because the LDP controlled both houses as a ruling party. In addition, the main 
opposition party, the DPJ, was relatively weak due to the popularity of the former 
government. Abe assumed that this support for the LDP extended automatically to him. 
Ironically, favorable political capital inherited from the former cabinet became a poison 
to Abe. In fact, this political asset and support had been built by the party under Koizumi. 
Obviously, Abe was the most promising successor in the Koizumi cabinet. He did not, 
however, understand the change of political trends under Koizumi such as weakened 
factions, a more significant cabinet, and the more prominent role of prime minister in 
elections. 133  Abe’s leadership in his first tenure conflicted with a new Japanese 
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institutional environment that had changed since the electoral reform and deepened under 
Koizumi.134 A series of political scandals of ministers who were appointed by Abe 
considerably undermined the credibility of the cabinet. Abe’s aggressive ideological 
agenda in the election was also given unkind treatment by the Japanese people. In this 
way, Abe assumed he had more credibility with the people than he actually did.  
By escaping from Koizumi’s political shadow, Abe led his second administration 
to a different outcome. Abe begun to create his own success story when he became prime 
minister again. In this time, relatively weak political assets provided Abe with an 
opportunity to listen to the voices of the Japanese people. Abe had no choice but to build 
up his political capital from zero political bases because, unlike his first tenure, the inter-
party power structure was drastically changed. Since he had left office, the DPJ had 
gotten stronger while his party, the LDP, was getting weaker. In 2009, when the DPJ 
achieved a turnover of power from the LDP, both houses were ruled by the DPJ’s rule 
while the LDP tumbled down to opposition party status for only the second time in post-
war history. The DPJ’s rule did not last for long, however. In 2012, the LDP was 
successful in regaining power by winning in the general election. Abe’s new economic 
thesis, Abenomics (his political trademark, as stated in the economic section), had a 
positive influence on his second tenure. Although Abe was still under pressure because 
he had no majority in the Upper House, he thoroughly focused his economic agenda to 
appeal to the public in the election. Finally, he successfully cemented credibility among 
the people by securing both houses within just one year after he was inaugurated in 
office. Through the process of taking back power from the DPJ, Abe became the main 
figure to lay a new political foundation of the LDP within domestic power dynamics. For 
conservatives, Abe was a hero, taking the LDP back to political prominence; therefore, 
Abe’s reputation within the LDP naturally strengthened. His overwhelming position in 
the party originated within the public. Abe constructed a stronger political position as 
prime minister than any other leading politician of the LDP in recent years.135 In this 
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way, different political conditions between the two tenures led Abe to learn how to 
achieve political success. 
B. ABE’S STRONG POSITION WITHIN THE LDP 
Although Abe became president of the LDP as successor to Koizumi in 2006, his 
popularity was not overwhelming. On 20 September 2006, Abe won the presidential 
election by defeating two candidates, Foreign Minister Aso Taro and Finance Minister 
Tanigaki Sadakazu. On one hand, Abe’s fresh image as a young prime minister and his 
dignified tone in dealing with the North Korean abduction issue appealed to the voters 
within the party.136 On the other hand, Abe’s popularity also stemmed from the absence 
of veteran politician Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo in the presidential 
race, one of the top competitors of Abe, who gave up his challenge to be president.137 In 
the party, there were still more high-ranking elite politicians besides Abe. Aware of his 
dropping approval ratings, Abe announced his resignation from the office in September 
2007. In turn, both Fukuda and Aso became successive prime ministers. The younger 
Abe was a good weapon for appealing to the party supporters; conversely, he still 
revealed a politically weak support base within the party by failing fully to recover his 
political position. 
Since 2012, no strong competitors against Abe have come forward in the LDP. 
Abe maneuvered Ishiba Shigeru, his main rival in the 2012 president election, out of his 
position as the LDP Secretary General in the 2014 September cabinet reshuffle.138 Abe 
was able to continue his presidency of the party since there were no candidates in the 
2015 presidential election. Thus, Abe became the main figure in the revival of the LDP’s 
dominance in elections, based on his political capital and premiership. Abe led his party 
four times to victory – in all elections during his second tenure – and still maintains a 
                                                 
136 Michael J. Green, “US-Japan Relations: Enter Abe Stage Right,” Comparative Connections  8.3
(October 2006). 
137 Ibid. 
138 Robert J. Pekkanen and Saadia M. Pekkanen, “All about Abe,” Asian Survey 55, No. 1 
(January/February 2015): 104–5.  
 62 
good level of approval. Since there are no alternative leaders within the party, the LDP 
cannot ignore Abe’s popularity. Figure 4 shows recent approval ratings of Abe’s cabinet. 
 
Figure 4.  The Approval and Disapproval Ratings of Prime Minister Abe’s 
Cabinet139 
Abe demonstrated his political maturity through satisfying his conservative 
supporters and showing restraint in ideological displays to keep broader support. Abe has 
satisfied the needs of conservatives within the party and support groups for the party. 
Conservative political performance also has a significant role in strengthening his 
position in the party. Abe’s achievement in the security domain during the second tenure 
has fulfilled much of what the conservative groups want. Surprisingly, Abe waited on his 
conservative movement until achieving political stability in summer election in 2013; 
then, he visited Yasukuni in December. Abe frequently showed his positive thinking 
about shrine visits to those conservative groups by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, and 
showing his willingness to venerate those who died in fighting for Japan. Since Abe 
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visited Yasukuni again in 2013, he keeps sending annual ritual offering to Yasukuni 
Shrine. Many former prime ministers gave up visits to Yasukuni Shrine due to the 
negative response from the Chinese and South Korean governments; Abe overcame these 
precedents, however, by accumulating a sufficient popularity to withstand “domestic 
backlash.”140 This made stronger ties between Abe and conservative groups.141 Besides, 
Abe also seemed to target conservative favorites such as a Secrets Protection Law and 
collective self-defense bill.142 By doing so, Abe was able to capture unwavering support 
within the conservative groups to support the LDP.  
Abe’s strong leadership within the party seems to be continuing. The LDP 
officially announced its decision to amend its party rules concerning the maximum tenure 
of the LDP president from six to nine years, providing Abe with the opportunity to extend 
his current tenure as a prime minister to 2021 if he were to win the presidential election 
in 2018.143 This amendment of presidential term length actually ensures a high possibility 
that Abe would be a unilateral candidate in the next presidential election within the party. 
Abe also created more time to adopt the amendment of Article 9, which would fulfill both 
Abe and the LDP’s long-cherished wish. 
C. WEAK OPPOSITION PARTIES 
Abe’s first term was marked by rising support for the DPJ, caused by a 
combination of disappointment in the LDP’s dominance and hope for change from the 
opposition party. As discussed earlier, the LDP had suffered from an absence of strong 
leaders since Koizumi’s retirement. The following LDP presidents (Abe, Fukuda, and 
Aso) failed to ensure political credibility; as a result, the LDP repeatedly replaced the 
leader of the party whenever prime ministers had lost their popularity. As a result, the 
public was disappointed with the LDP due to the instability of its leadership. The 
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symptoms of the disappointment began from the Abe administration by losing his 
position early. By showing a lower level of performance in economic reform and 
relatively more focus on ideological issues, Abe failed to hold people’s interest. A series 
of scandals of cabinet ministers and the pension scandal of the ruling LDP heightened the 
public’s disappointment. As a result, the cabinet was overthrown in less than a year. 
Conversely, the DPJ could take relative benefit from the unpopularity of the LDP leaders 
in the post-Koizumi era.144 The public showed its political preference for a compelling 
alternative to the LDP. This expectation was linked to the rise of the DPJ in the 2007 
Upper House election. Ozawa Ichiro, the leader of the DPJ, tried to earn public credibility 
not only from the city but also from rural areas that had been traditionally strong areas of 
the LDP, while emphasizing Abe’s lack of commitment to the Japanese people’s 
concerns.145 In addition, the DPJ’s election strategy was not only to show criticism of the 
LDP as an opposition party but also to promote its capability as a new governing 
party.146 These strategies hit the mark in the election, as the DPJ secured a majority in the 
Upper House for the first time in history. Tobias Harris also evaluated the DPJ’s victory 
as follows: “The DPJ forged a national brand, based upon the party’s manifesto. 
Regardless of the district, DPJ candidates campaigned on the same agenda. Unlike the 
LDP, the DPJ waged a relentlessly positive campaign, focused on its own policy 
proposals instead of criticism of LDP rule.”147 Mixed effects of frustration over the LDP 
and the rise of the DPJ increased the DPJ’s political reputation as a possible political 
replacement for the LDP. In 2009, the DPJ finally became a ruling party by defeating the 
LDP in the general election. Figure 5 shows approval ratings of the two parties. 
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Figure 5.  Approval Ratings of the LDP and the DPJ, 1998–2012148 
Opposition party weakness contributed to Abe’s being more successful during the 
second tenure. The decline of the DPJ, the ruling party from 2009 to 2012, was one of the 
most significant reasons behind the LDP’s win in elections. Fragmentation among the 
opposition parties also helped the sole lead of the Abe administration in Japan. Thus, 
whether the coalition of the opposition parties can recover its credibility should be one of 
the main factors to both Abe’s continued political success and the LDP’s further 
dominance in Japan.  
The lack of popularity of the DPJ mostly originated from its governing experience 
as the ruling regime from 2009 to 2012. The DPJ’s leaders tried to apply various 
measures contrary to the LDP for shaping a new Japan; the decisive weak point of the 
DPJ, however, was the party’s lack of experience in governing the state. During the three 
years of DPJ rule, the party revealed a lack of adequate leadership, an absence of 
coordination with bureaucrats in the government, insufficient governmental role as a 
control tower in facing natural disasters, and insufficient consultation over what became 
                                                 
148 Source from Kenji E. Kushida and Phillip Y. Lipscy, Japan under the DPJ: The Politics of 
Transition and Governance, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2013, 15. 
 66 
unilateral policies. Hatoyama Yukio, the first prime minister from the DPJ, showed a lack 
of policy coordination within the government as well as with its US ally. For example, 
Hatoyama promised to construct a “close and equal Japan-US alliance” by explaining his 
basic policies.149 A specific policy of this agenda was relocation of the Futenma Air 
Station, a main overseas facility of the U.S. Marine Corps, outside Okinawa. 
Negotiations with the United States did not proceed smoothly, however, revealing 
systemic trouble within the Japanese government between party politicians and 
bureaucrats. In dealing with this issue, the DPJ was known to exclude foreign and 
defense bureaucrats from the government levels of the policymaking process.150 In the 
end, Hatoyama withdrew his original plan of relocating Futenma Air Base. Yuki Tatsumi 
pointed out the incapability of Hatoyama’s cabinet to promote policy: “The lack of 
consensus within the party over its basic policies has prevented the DPJ from unifying its 
policy positions, rendering it ineffective in advancing the legislation needed to achieve its 
policy goals.”151  
The DPJ’s incapability was even more obvious during the catastrophic natural 
disaster of the Great Tohoku Earthquake on 11 March 2011. The government failed to 
proactively control the Fukushima nuclear plant in a timely and appropriate manner. 
Rather, the government played a blame game with Tokyo Electric, the owner of the 
nuclear site, and showed dissonance even while a number of the local people in the 
accident area were in danger.152 Through the Fukushima crisis, the DPJ revealed its 
vulnerability in working with industry, and this reminded the public of the much better 
coordination in the LDP government: “One would think the DPJ could have steered the 
blame for the Fukushima disasters on the long time ruling party, the LDP that had very 
close ties to the industry and the bureaucracy that was supposed to supervise the industry 
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and prevent problems like those of March 11th.”153 Prime Minister Kan Naoto had lost 
an opportunity to demonstrate his leadership by mishandling the crisis response. Gerald 
Curtis identified a political disaster under the three years of the DPJ rule, and he found 
several causes: 
Many factors contributed to the DPJ’s failure, among the most important 
being the ineptitude of prime minister Yukio Hatoyama, the effort by 
Ichiro Ozawa to control the party, the party’s bureaucrat-bashing 
approach, poor handling of the crises created by the Tohoku earthquake 
and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima. It looked as though the party might 
be getting its bearings under prime minister Yoshihiko Noda, but by then 
it was too late.154 
Ultimately, Noda, a successor to Kan, lost the DPJ’s governing power by failing 
in a 2012 snap election called for the consumption tax rise to 10 percent. During the three 
years of DPJ rule, the government generally showed political weakness in domestic 
politics and economy, security and foreign affairs, and more importantly in failing to 
improve morale of the public. Figure 6 shows the approval ratings of the DPJ prime 
ministers. 
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Figure 6.  Prime Ministers’ Cabinet Approval Ratings under DPJ Rule, 
2009–2012155 
The Japanese people are still ostracizing the DPJ due to a negative image of its 
political capability. The DPJ failed to satisfy the Japanese high expectations by showing 
no transformative policy changes.156 As a result, all DPJ prime ministers—Hatoyama, 
Kan, and Noda—fell to the same destiny as the post-Koizumi LDP leaders, without 
having any political impact as an alternative leadership. The Japanese people seemed to 
have a sense of deep betrayal about their expectations toward the DPJ when the DPJ 
proved its political incapability during its time in power. This negative image of the DPJ 
seemed hard to escape under the second Abe administration.  
The DPJ’s lack of popularity limited voters’ options in choosing political 
alternatives to the second Abe administration. In 2012, the LDP returned to power, and 
the DPJ never won any further elections. These failures were mostly attributed to the 
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DPJ’s lack of popularity among voters. For example, Banri Kaieda, the president of the 
DPJ from 2012 to 2014, lost his district seat in the Lower House election in December 
2014. Soon after, Kaieda decided to resign from his office. This was a huge humiliation 
for the DPJ and a reflection of people’s frustration toward the main opposition party.157 
Katsuya Okada, the next leader of the DPJ, failed to increase the DPJ’s approval ratings 
even when given an opportunity upon Abe’s facing severe protest from the public due to 
the collective self-defense bill. In September 2015, when the collective self-defense bill 
was approved by the diet, the government lost almost 7.2 percent of its approval rating 
(from 46 percent to 38.8 percent), and the DPJ gained just 3.8 percent in its approval 
rating (from 12.4 percent to 16.2 percent). 158  The DPJ continued to mark average 
approval ratings almost below 15 percent since Abe took power, and even early in 2016 
the DPJ still showed only 14.6 percent popularity.159 
Fragmentation among the opposition parties also contributed to the dominance of 
the LDP. A split in the opposition parties in the present party structure gave the LDP 
political advantages. From 2009 to 2013, the Japanese two-party system collapsed by 
splintering into 13 parties: four major parties, four minor parties, and five micro 
parties.160 The opposition parties promptly fell into a trap due to the chaotic political 
situation that had created them. Each candidate from the opposition parties had to 
compete against the LDP and other parties as well. It seemed also difficult to make 
coalitions among the opposition parties, with their diverse political identities, to win a 
district seats. The splits in the opposition parties have kept them from gaining political 
credibility from the Japanese, even when Abe was met with political crisis in keeping his 
hard stance on security policy. The public seemed to judge that the opposition parties 
were not viable political alternatives to Abe’s administration and the LDP. As shown in 
Figure 7, the split in the opposition parties helped keep them from threatening the LDP’s 
dominance. Institutionally, it seems difficult to change the present electoral system. 
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Therefore, for survival in elections, it seems essential to make strong coalitions or at least 
to identify joint opposition candidates in electoral districts. 
 
*JRP: Restoration Party, NKP: New Komeito Party, and JCP: Communist Party  
**The LDP and NKP form the ruling coalition 
 
Figure 7.  The Japanese Main Political Parties’ Approval Ratings: 2013–2016161 
The DPJ’s and Japan Innovation Party (JIP)’s leaders have made an effort to 
create a large opposition coalition against the LDP; a new coalition would still face 
obstacles, however. In early 2016, a leaders meeting of the DPJ and the JIP suggested the 
two parties merge and pursue a new political movement. On 27 March, the DPJ and the 
JIP announced the creation of a new coalition party, the Democratic Party (DP). This 
agreement made one potential threat to the LDP’s dominance because the DP aimed to 
prevent the LDP’s further dominance in the July Upper House election.162 The DP failed 
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to refresh its image among voters, however. Rather, the DP lost 13 seats, going from 62 
to 49 in the House of Councilors. For the DP, two main hurdles remain. First, although 
both parties agreed to merge, the sum of both parties’ Diet members is wanting in ability 
against the ruling coalition of the LDP and the Komeito. Under the current situation, it is 
impossible to threaten the ruling coalition with reasonable actions. Second, it is still 
unclear how the new party would be shaped. If they cannot prove to be a viable political 
alternative (i.e., if their new political platform does not appeal to the Japanese people), it 
will continue to be difficult to win elections. The most significant challenge of the DP is 
how to integrate into a single, united voice. The DP must skillfully manage its broad and 
diverse political spectrum. The DP should overcome this constraint within the party and 
align their party’s unified interests to the public’s concerns in order to compete with the 
LDP. If the new opposition coalition cannot play a political role of checks and balances 
against the ruling regime to a certain extent, the Abe administration can make its 
continued political dominance more likely.  
D. ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 
There is no doubt that economic revitalization is significant for Japan due to its 
long-lasting stagnation since the 1990s. During the period between the two Abe 
administrations, the Japanese economic situation continued to worsen. The domestically 
complex political economic situation was intertwined with the global economic crisis, 
however. This forced a search for solutions to the economic stagnation. 
Political instability of the ruling LDP kept it from continuing its strong economic 
reform drive in the post-Koizumi era. While Koizumi made an effort toward economic 
reforms and strengthening neoliberal policies, his change did not firmly hold. Post-
Koizumi politicians could not maintain strong economic reform policies because they did 
not have sufficient approval from the public. As a result, no consistent and clear-cut 
policy was pursued by the post-Koizumi governments, making the Japanese economic 
situation more difficult.  
To make matters worse, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 and the Great 
East Japan Earthquake in 2011 prevented economic recovery and prolonged Japan’s long 
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stagnation. As the GFC had struck at global capital markets, including those of the United 
States and Europe, by damaging financial infrastructures, Japan also took an economic 
blow.163 In particular, a downturn in global trade resulting from the GFC had a negative 
impact on the Japanese economy. 164  This is because Japanese industries are mainly 
supported by a trade-oriented economic infrastructure. Japan’s GDP in the first quarter of 
2009 sharply declined by almost four percent.165 In 2008 and 2009, the government 
launched extensive monetary and fiscal policy measures representing 27.4 trillion yen; 
consequently, the national financing deficit increased, and fiscal regulation became 
weak.166 In addition to the GFC, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake was an economic 
burden. The shock of the great natural disaster constricted not only economic optimism 
among consumers but also fiscal sustainability. The economic index showed negative 
growth and the government could not help but spend on revitalization of the East Japan 
local area.167 Continued unfavorable factors led the Japanese people to perceive some 
amount of economic and psychological chaos.  
Most important, because power shifted back and forth between the LDP and DPJ, 
it was not possible to propel a coherent economic policy and, therefore, also difficult to 
achieve economic efficiency. Japan’s developmental state had been known as an “East 
Asia Miracle.”168 Its model was based on state-led intervention in the economy under a 
long-lasting single dominant ruling regime. 169  In other words, Japanese economic 
success has most likely been influenced by political stability that pursued the optimal 
balance between coherent policy-oriented governmental efforts and the market economy. 
Consistent and stable economic discipline facilitated cooperation of bureaucratic elites 
and capital, which led to an efficient business relationship. Since the 1990s, however, this 
                                                 
163 T.J. Pempel and Keiichi Tsunekawa, eds. Two Crises, Different Outcomes: East Asia and Global 
Finance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 202. 
164 Ibid.  
165 Looney, “Japan Economy.” 
166 Pempel and Tsunekawa, Two Crises, Different Outcomes, 202–3; Looney, “Japan Economy.” 
167 Ibid. 
168 Pempel and Tsunekawa, Two Crises, Different Outcomes, 22. 
169 Dwight H. Perkins, Steven Radelet, and David L. Lindauer, Economics of Development (Norton, 
2006), 179. 
 73 
economic virtuous circle has changed to a vicious circle between regime change and 
economic downturn. Contrary to Japan’s political stability in the twentieth century under 
LDP rule, in the twenty-first century the Japanese economic structure has suffered from a 
less stable political structure, as the regime has changed twice. Past coherent economic 
policy disappeared each time the regime changed. Frequent replacement of leadership 
worries individual business actors enough that it can affect economic development for the 
future. The uncertainty of the overall economic situation damaged core economic factors, 
including producers, investors, and consumers, and thus reduced the positive prospects of 
the Japanese economy.170 Under these conditions, the Japanese people seemed too long 
for strong leadership to escape from the vicious economic circle. 
In an example of good timing, Abe’s strong economic drive, Abenomics, matched 
the desires of the public for economic improvement. As mentioned earlier, Abe prepared 
a new government-oriented economic policy, including monetary stimulus, fiscal 
stimulus, and structural reform. Although several fiscal stimuli had occurred since 
Japan’s bubble economy, all these trials were short-term policy. In contrast, Abenomics 
accompanied unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus. Abe’s strong economic drive 
aroused the public’s interest in the economy by providing positive outcomes in a short 
time. The Japanese people approved of his economic policy through elections. Also, 
during the first year of his second tenure, Abe created a dependable economic structure to 
promote consistent economic policy without political vacillation. Regardless of 
Abenomics’ success, there currently do not appear to be any other economic options. 
Knowing this well, Abe stated in a press conference when he announced the consumption 
tax rise postponement, “There are now criticisms against Abenomics that it has been a 
failure, or that it is not going well. However, if that is the case, then what should be done 
instead?” 171  Judging Abenomics’ success is still difficult. Unlike during his former 
tenure, however, Abe has kept promoting Abenomics with strong volition during the last 
three years. Also, the public does not want to prevent him from working on it because the 
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people’s belief in the DPJ has been shattered; there is no alternative to Abenomics, and 
Abe still shows his high commitment to economic revitalization. 
 75 
V. REGIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
With political uncertainty such as the rise of China and North Korea’s bolder 
provocations increasing instability in Northeast Asia, Abe’s degree of success was also 
contingent on changes in the regional environment. In this chapter, I will examine how 
skillfully Abe strengthened security policy by handling regional circumstances in his 
second administration, focusing on the U.S.-Japan alliance, China, and the Korean 
Peninsula. 
A. THE STRONGER U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
Abe has preferred to consolidate the strong relationship with the United States 
during both tenures because support for the U.S.-Japan alliance is his basic foreign policy 
stance. Abe has shown a tendency to develop foreign and security policies with 
coordination through the U.S.-Japan alliance. Abe’s aggressive domestic policy and the 
sudden collapse of his approval ratings, however, undermined his attempt to facilitate the 
U.S.-Japan alliance in his first administration. In his second administration, with political 
uncertainty such as the rise of China and North Korea’s bolder provocations increasing 
instability in Northeast Asia, Abe’s degree of success has also been contingent upon 
changes in the regional environment. Therefore, the combination of U.S. strategy for the 
region and Abe’s proactive pacifism in his second administration promoted shared 
interests. In this section, I will examine the shift of U.S. strategic requirements and Abe’s 
security policy development. 
1. Changes in U.S. Strategic Requirements in the Asia-Pacific 
After Abe resigned as prime minister in 2007, the United States rebuilt its grand 
strategy to sustain its global leadership. President Obama presented a new national 
strategy known as the “Pivot to Asia” (or “Rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific”). In early 
2012, after Obama officially declared an end to the Iraq war, he transitioned his national 
strategy to focus on Asia. Obama presented the goal of U.S. grand strategy as sustaining 
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U.S. global leadership within global turmoil.172 One of the fundamental goals of the U.S. 
strategic shift was to implement a better response to China’s emergence as a more 
influential power in the region.173 During the last several decades, China’s economic 
power had drastically increased, by almost 10 percent per year, and its economic 
integration capability deeply penetrated states in the region, changing the geopolitical 
landscape.174  Bader infers that Obama’s regional strategy is focused largely on China:  
Devote a higher priority to the Asia-Pacific region; React in a balanced 
way to the rise of China; Strengthen alliances and develop new 
partnerships…Understand that it is impossible to pursue a sound policy 
without economic recovery at home…Join regional institutions that the 
United States has stayed apart from; Speak and act with clarity on the 
universality of human rights while understanding and taking into account 
the differences between societies.175  
Based on Obama’s rebalancing strategy, the United States influenced the Asian-Pacific 
region by pressing China and seeking stronger security partnerships. 
a. What Does Japan Bring to the United States? 
These Obama principles of Asian-Pacific strategy revealed implications for the 
United States that the Japan would be the most favorable strategic partner to facilitate its 
national interests. For the United States, Japan is the most compelling power to balance 
China in the region economically, militarily and ideologically.  
Economically, as the third largest economy in the world, Japan is still a global 
economic power, despite recent weak performance. Since 2008, Obama has promoted the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as playing a vital economic role for the United States 
and the world.176 By Japan participating in the TPP, the strategic significance of the U.S.-
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led new global trade institution would increase.177 Although the United States did not 
prevent China from joining TPP, in reality, it was difficult for China to participate in TPP 
due to its strong tariff elimination schedule.178 On 4 February 2016, the TPP agreement 
was signed by 12 Pacific Rim countries, not including China. If the TPP were to be 
successful, the United States would not only mitigate its economic decline during the last 
decade but also strengthen its regional primacy.  
Militarily, a series of events made the U.S.-Japan alliance stronger. The Japanese 
self-defense forces (JSDF), especially its naval force, enjoy a certain amount of military 
capability to balance against potential Chinese assertive behavior in the region. In 
particular, as China under Xi strongly asserted its maritime sovereignty around the East 
and South China Seas with rapid military modernization, the U.S. needed to rebalance its 
military in the Asia-Pacific region. Domestic budgetary pressures, however, worked 
against the greater requirements of the navy.179 In the 2012 Strategy Review, it seemed to 
be difficult to expand the size of the Navy, due to a curtailment in the military budget.180 
Thus, from the U.S. perspective, the JSDF’s role relatively increased, especially in the 
area of naval capability toward maritime strategy. Historically, the United States had led 
Japanese rearmament to support military operations in the Korean War. During the Cold 
War, the United States had countered the Soviet Union by deploying its armed forces to 
Japanese bases. Even during the post-Cold War, the JSDF had evolved to expand its 
limited use-of-force capability to support the U.S.-Japan alliance. In light of this, the 
possibility of strengthening U.S.-Japan cooperation in the military domain seemed more 
likely. 
Lastly, the U.S.-Japan alliance would give prominence to a mutual ideological 
agenda to undermine China’s regional influence. Although China has developed 
                                                 
177 Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? 22. 
178 “Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” United States Trade Representative 
(USTR), 4 October 2015, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership.  




economic and military resources, it is still criticized for universal and important issues 
such as human rights. The United States and Japan have strongly shared democratic 
values and rule of law, which can weaken China’s authority. From these three points of 
view, for the United States, Japan’s strategic role in the region would be significant to 
achieve U.S. rebalancing goals. 
b. DPJ Rule: Challenges for U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy 
From 2009, the DPJ prime ministers, however, shifted their focus toward Asia-
centric foreign policy. In particular, Prime Minister Hatoyama professed a different 
philosophy from the view of the United States. Hatoyama’s view of the postwar Japanese 
foreign policy was that it was excessively dependent on the United States.181 He thought 
that the Japanese should determine their security more autonomously.182 Under his firm 
vision, Hatoyama had fundamentally reexamined the plan to relocate Marine Corps Ait 
Station Futenma in Okinawa. Furthermore, Hatoyama wanted to transition Japanese 
security policy from a U.S.-centric policy to an Asia-centric policy. He strongly respected 
“East Asian Community” values, especially regarding South Korea and China. 183 
Hatoyama’s Asia-centric policy considerably challenged U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy. 
For the United States, this discrepancy in policies between the U.S. and Japanese 
government created a greater challenge than ever before. Hatoyama’s Asia-centric vision 
disrupted the U.S. pivot to Asia. Hatoyama’s legacies influenced his successor Naoto 
Kan. Kan announced that he would also continue Hatoyama’s diplomatic approach of an 
Asia-centric foreign policy.184 Even though the DPJ prime minister changed, Asia-centric 
foreign policy continued. As a result, U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy was weakened by one of 
its most favorable allies, Japan, now under DPJ rule. 
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2. Abe’s Security Revision under the Stronger U.S.-Japan Alliance 
Unlike the DPJ’s, Abe’s security and foreign policy in his second tenure has fit 
U.S. national interests in the region. On 18 January 2013, Abe revealed the basic foreign 
policy conditions of his second administration through his speech of Five New Principles 
for Japanese Diplomacy: 
The first is protecting freedom of thought, expression, and speech in this 
region...the second is ensuring that the seas, which are the most vital 
commons to us all, are governed by laws and rules, not by might...the third 
principle is pursuing free, open, interconnected economies as part of 
Japan’s diplomacy...the fourth principle...is bringing about ever more 
fruitful intercultural ties among the peoples of Japan and this region...the 
fifth...is promoting exchange among the younger generations who will 
carry our nations into the future.
185
 
Abe’s five new principles were favorable to Obama’s Asia-Pacific strategy. Through his 
doctrine, Abe stressed democratic norms and values. Expressing similarities with the 
Western community, Abe emphasized Japan’s responsible role to region based on the 
rule of law.
186
 On a bigger scale, Abe’s five new principles shared content with Obama’s 
principles of Asia-Pacific strategy. By pressuring China with ideological common values, 
both countries’ principles shared the burden of encouraging China to recognize its 
responsible role in the international community. In the G7 summit in Brussels in June 
2014, countries declared their opposition to useless tensions in the East and South China 
Seas resulting from any unilateral attempt to assert maritime or territorial claims by 
criticizing China indirectly.
187
 In the region, Abe also made efforts to share maritime 
interests based on international law with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) against the unilateral assertiveness of China around sea sovereignty.  
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For the United States, Abe’s proactive pacifism diplomacy, unlike with the DPJ 
government, reduced U.S. political burdens in the region. In his second administration, 
Abe’s diplomacy reshaped external extension at the regional level by focusing on global 
common values, while in his first administration he had tried to resolve regional tensions 
by improving bilateral relations with China. Yoo argues that Abe’s revisionist movement 
fit U.S. national interests: “The U.S. regards Japan as a buck-passing state that can stand 
off China so that she fully supports the normal militarized state of Japan while the U.S. 
put more efforts to other nations in the Asian Pacific area to secure forward deployable 
bases where she can project her power.” 188  Abe’s proactive pacifism fit in with 
developing Japan’s capabilities as well as being sufficient to fulfill the United States’ 
demand for primacy in the region.  
Abe’s security revision plan materialized due to the U.S.’s shifting strategy to 
Asia and its approval of Abe’s proactive pacifism. This was confirmed by a delicate 
attitude change by the U.S. government. In April 2013, Secretary Kerry stated neutrally 
when he visited Tokyo: “US has no position on ultimate sovereignty, recognition of 
Japan’s administrative control, addressing the issue through peaceful means, and 
opposing any unilateral or coercive action to change the status quo.”189 The next April, 
the United States changed its perspective toward the Senkaku Islands and leaned more to 
Japan. Obama confirmed a defense pledge to Japan based on the U.S.-Japan Defense 
Treaty by reassuring Japan in the joint press conference: “Our commitment to Japan’s 
security is absolute and article five of the security treaty covers all territories under 
Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands.” 190  The U.S. security pledge 
around the Senkaku Islands was decisive to enable Abe to move forward. This is because 
the U.S. perspective strongly supported Abe’s domestic approval in executing a more 
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bold policy toward China.
191
 Based on support for Japanese nationalism around the 
Senkaku issue and security pledge of the United States, Abe could specify a new security 
package.  
The 2014 U.S.-Japan summit was a watershed event for Abe to develop his 
security vision. Through the summit, U.S.-Japan leaders accelerated the expansion of 
strategic cooperation in the region, especially specifying economic and security agendas. 
The two countries reaffirmed shared economic interests by treating TPP as a constructive 
economic program in the region, and they agreed to step forward to conclude TPP.192 In 
particular, in the joint press conference on 24 April, the two leaders showed a more 
concrete strategic partnership in the security realm. Obama welcomed Abe’s main 
defense agenda, the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and Abe promised 
Japan’s devotion to the Obama rebalancing strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region.193 
Through the summit, under the stronger U.S.-Japan alliance, Abe was able to add 
external motivation to his existing domestic support to propel the right of collective self-
defense. On 1 July, Abe decided to proceed with the right of collective self-defense bill 
through the decision of the cabinet, and the United States supported Abe’s decision. On 
19 December, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida and Secretary of State Kerry 
announced the joint statement of the 2+2 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 
(SCC) meeting:  
The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and Japan's policy of 
‘Proactive Contribution to Peace,’ based on the principle of international 
cooperation, both contribute to efforts by the Alliance to ensure a peaceful 
and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. Along these lines, the Government of 
the United States welcomes and supports efforts made by the Government 
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of Japan in the security field, including the cabinet decision on July 1, 
2014, for developing seamless security legislation.194 
The Collective Self-Defense bill passed both Houses in September 2015. Although Abe’s 
decision met domestic backlash, he was strong enough to overcome this backlash by 
spending his political capital. Internationally, China and another ally of the United States, 
South Korea, expressed concern about the Japanese security bill’s influencing regional 
instability; U.S. support of Japan, however, was strong enough to help Japan withstand 
their concerns. 
The United States and Japan were able to fulfill mutual national interests by 
making the U.S.-Japan alliance stronger in the region. The United States improved its 
declining military projection by means of Japan’s participating in collective defense in 
the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the United States is looking forward to realizing 
economic benefits by establishing the TPP alongside Japan. Meanwhile, Abe reduced his 
territorial concerns about the Senkaku Islands by reaffirming the U.S.-Japan defense 
treaty. At the same time, Abe was able to expand opportunities for use of force, the right 
of collective self-defense, through the official support of the U.S. government. Japan 
came closer to shaping a new grand strategy, amendment of Article 9, by changing its 
security policy (which had lasted almost 70 years) fundamentally. 
B. RISING CHINA 
Rising China has shaped Japanese people’s hostile perceptions toward China; at 
the same time, Abe has improved his political strength by exploiting a narrative of rising 
China toward revision, creating plans for Japanese normalization trajectory. This section 
will examine the rise of China and its implications for Japan. I will explore how rising 
China may affect Japanese perceptions of hostility and Japan’s domestic politics, 
especially Abe’s normalization trajectory.  
The 2006 Yasukuni issue caused high political tension between China and Japan. 
Although Koizumi had visited Yasukuni annually since he became prime minister in 
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2001, his visit on 15 August 2006 made the situation worse. As mentioned earlier, China 
and South Korea regard August 15 as an annual anniversary of national independence, 
and they are considerably sensitive when Japanese politicians visit Yasukuni, where some 
Class-A war criminals are buried. Therefore, the two countries perceived Koizumi’s 
behavior as an insult. China protested Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni by requiring a meeting 
with the Japanese ambassador while the Chinese ambassador made a protest to the 
Japanese Foreign Minister.195 China focused on Tokyo’s future diplomatic response on 
this issue, especially the actions of the next Prime Minister Abe, because Koizumi’s 
August 15 visit was the last official visit during his tenure.  
Abe wanted to improve relations with China by diplomatic means. Even before 
the inauguration, Abe clearly expressed his desire to open a summit with China to resolve 
the issue.196 On 8 October 2006, the Beijing summit between Abe and Hu Jintao, the 
Chinese president, was held. They agreed to promote cooperation in the economic and 
environmental realms through a “mutually beneficial strategic relationship.” 197  Abe 
expressed his intention to enhance Sino-Japanese relations by making China the 
destination for his first overseas travel, and China also responded positively to Abe’s 
future-oriented manner.198 Through the summit, Abe and Hu agreed to examine ways to 
resolve the complex historical issue.199  Abe made efforts to reduce tension between 
China and Japan. 
Abe’s keynote of diplomacy was to pursue increasing political, security, and 
economic ties with Northeast Asian countries during his first tenure. Within this big 
picture, Abe actively explored reciprocal relationships. In addition, historical issues did 
not help the U.S.-Japan alliance. U.S. political experts were cautious about the potential 
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for Japanese historical issues to cause instability in the region. Furthermore, Chinese 
leadership kept pursuing moderate foreign policy with neighbors to continue to achieve 
its peaceful development. President Hu also supported seeking common ground for 
restoring the relationship with Japan. Japan’s Asian-friendly diplomacy continued after 
Abe’s first administration.  
1. Rising China 
By 2010, China had become the second largest country in the global economy and 
this economic rise increased Japan’s economic dependence on China. Since Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reform and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) pragmatic 
adoption of a free market system in 1979, China had continued to achieve economic 
development. As shown in Figure 8, China averaged almost 10 percent real annual GDP 
growth during those periods.200 Global investors regarded the growing Chinese market as 
a new engine to support sustained economic development. The opportunities provided by 
China’s economic growth also affected bilateral economic relations between China and 
Japan. China is one of the most significant economic partners for Japan, due to Japan’s 
economic decline since the 1990s. 201  Increasing economic dependence on China, 
however, means that Japan could suffer relative economic vulnerability. If this relative 
economic disparity grows and diplomatic conflicts expand between the two countries, 
negative mutual relations could damage the Japanese economy. 
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Figure 8.  Chinese Real GDP Growth: 1979–2014202 
Over the last two decades, China’s military has modernized rapidly amid 
economic development. Since the middle of the 1990s, China has continuously increased 
its military budget and improved its defense capabilities. This growth is more 
conspicuous when Chinese military expenditures are compared to Japan’s. As shown in 
Figure 9, China’s military expenditure (52179 billion) exceeded Japan’s military 
expenditure (47156 billion) in 2001 for the first time in history, while Japan (45896 
billion) was higher than China (27837 billion) in military expenditure in 1996.203 In 
2015, China’s military budget was almost five times (214787 billion) more than that of 
Japan (40885 billion).204 China became the second largest country in the world in terms 
of its military budget, following the United States.  
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Figure 9.  Military Expenditure 1996–2015: China and Japan 
(2015, U.S.$ Billions)205 
On the basis of those aggressive military expenditures, the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) continues to develop its military capabilities. These include nuclear strike 
capabilities; the collective Chinese defense capability known as Anti-Access/Area Denial 
(A2/AD); Information Operations; Cyber Operations; Long-Range Precision Strike; 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD); Surface and Undersea Operations; Space and Counter-
space; Integrated Air and Missile Defense; and Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) modernization.206 Chinese leadership seems to base its 
decisions on the belief that a strong military plays a significant role in ensuring core 
national interests.207 This rapid military buildup has caused security concern on the part 
of the countries of the northeast Asia region, especially Japan, and the United States as 
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well. 208  China’s rapid military modernization program is likely to cause increasing 
regional tension. 
2. The Advent of Xi and His Assertive Foreign Policy 
Adding to the recent trends of China’s economic and military rise, the advent of 
Xi Jinping, a new leader of China from 2012, has expanded China’s role in the region. 
Zhang argued that President Xi tries to play a more proactive role in international affairs 
even as China pursues its national goal of peaceful development.209 Xi’s foreign policy is 
considerably distinguished from that of the former leadership. 210  One of the most 
significant features of Xi’s foreign policy is its official emphasis on China’s intention to 
strongly pursue its interests in the international arena. It is natural for a state to pursue its 
national interests in foreign affairs; this is a strikingly different approach from the former 
CCP leadership, however.211 For example, Xi suggested a new type of major country 
relationship in Sino-U.S. relations at a meeting with President Obama in June 2013.212 
Xi’s proposal seemed to run counter to the “responsible stakeholder” idea suggested by 
U.S. initiatives in 2005. In turn, China requested that the U.S. contribute to more 
constructive efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, China made clear that it 
would not sacrifice its own interests in the region. In this manner, a basic theme of 
Chinese foreign policy under Xi can be summarized as the pursuit of peaceful 
development and a protection of core national interests.  
Under Xi’s assertive foreign policy, Sino-Japanese bilateral relations have 
become more competitive and challenging. For instance, territorial disputes around the 
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands always have potential to escalate to a high level of direct crisis 
between the two countries. Each country strongly claims the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands as 
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its own territory. When the 2012 Senkaku crisis occurred, Sino-Japanese relations fell 
into their worst condition since the end of the Second World War. This crisis also 
touched on sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. China unilaterally declared an 
Airspace Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, and also 
intensified territorial disputes and competition over resources around the South China 
Sea. These maritime security disputes became a direct source of Sino-Japanese rivalry.213  
China’s rising also indirectly contributes to Japanese internal perceptions of China 
as a threat with severe regional security concerns. During the 20th century, Japan held a 
dominant position over China, militarily and economically. In the 21st century, however, 
the situation turned in China’s favor. China surpassed Japan in economic power in 2010. 
While Japan could use its economic leverage over China in the past, the current economic 
power balance enables China to use its economic leverage to damage Japanese 
interests.214 As stated above, China is going along its military modernization rapidly, 
having five times more budget than Japan. Regardless of China’s intentions, a fear of 
Japan is China’s rise toward hegemony status.215 This suspicion may lead Japan to try to 
impede this rise. 
The 2012 Senkaku crisis created the most serious damage to the bilateral relations 
between Japan and China. The Japanese government’s purchase of the Senkaku Islands 
from their private Japanese owner on 11 September 2012 was fundamentally changed the 
relationship between China and Japan. In history, both countries had agreed to avoid the 
Senkaku dispute for diplomatic win-win Cooperation under the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship.216 The issue, however, has become a major conflict between the 
two countries since a 2010 boat collision incident between a Chinese trawler and patrol 
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boats of the Japanese Coast Guard near the Senkakus. Ishihara Shintaro, Tokyo Governor 
and long-time conservative politician, initiated purchasing the Senkakus to protect 
national territory.217 Once the Japanese government accepted this policy, the Senkaku 
crisis came to test China’s diplomacy regarding Japan as a strategic partner. 
Unlike in his first administration, Abe presented a hard political stance toward 
China from the beginning of his term in office. Abe pointed to the weakness of the DPJ 
by saying, “The blatant entry of Chinese ships into Japanese waters was the result of ‘the 
diplomatic failure of the DPJ.’”218  Even after the election, Abe firmly regarded the 
Senkaku Islands as the inherent territory of Japan by stating that “there is no room for 
negotiations about that.” 219  Abe decided on balancing toward China. No bilateral 
meetings with China for the first 23 months of his second term in office meant that his 
hard stance toward China and poor relationship with rising China was continuing.  
Abe’s change in diplomatic attitude was responsible for a different dimension of 
the conflict from the 2006 Yasukuni dispute. The Senkakus issue is a sovereignty dispute 
over the maritime area around the East China Sea.220 A sovereignty issue resulting from 
territorial conflict is a zero-sum game, while historical conflict is based on ideological 
disputes. Whether governed by the DPJ or the LDP, the Japanese government applied a 
no-compromise policy on the Senkaku dispute. Thus, characteristics of the 2012 Senkaku 
crisis were fundamentally different from the 2006 Yasukuni dispute. Also, unlike the 
2006 Yasukuni crisis, the Senkaku issue geopolitically connected to the strategic interests 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the region. Concerted actions of the alliance and the 
cooperation with other Asian countries are essential to keep their maritime sovereignty 
around the East and South China Seas as well. Furthermore, considering trends of Xi’s 
diplomacy, it is doubtful that Japan will look forward to cooperating with China. 
Considering Chinese history, China will pursue its assertive policy more likely because 
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China was considerably sensitive to the sovereignty matter. Consequently, the Senkaku 
crisis deepened a confrontation between the Sino-Japanese relations. The crisis greatly 
encouraged people to form a negative image of each other and decision makers to exploit 
domestic demands. 
3. Senkaku Nationalism 
The combination of historical and sovereignty disputes around the Senkaku 
Islands made the Japanese perceive China as a threat. This perception developed into 
Senkaku nationalism, aligning the Japanese government with the public. This form of 
relationship reveals how rising China has impacted Japanese domestic politics. Changes 
of security strategy such as collective self-defense have been mostly influenced by the 
concerns of Japan and its allies toward rising China, making the region unstable.  
As China has rapidly modernized its military, Japan has continued to perceive 
China as a substantial threat. According to a survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun and 
Gallup, 78 percent of Japanese perceived China as a military threat.221 The main reason 
are as follows: (1) Chinese vessels’ encroachment on Japanese territorial water near the 
Senkaku Islands and (2) Chinese attempts to mine undersea resources around the 
Senkaku Islands.222   
Under the second Abe administration, the perception of China as a threat has 
gradually increased. Public opinion toward China grew worse. For example, according to 
a survey conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in 2006, 44 percent of the Japanese people 
regarded China as a threat.223 Anti-China sentiment rapidly increased after the Senkaku 
dispute, however. On 12 August 2013, Xinhua revealed that 92.8 percent of Japanese had 
a negative image toward China.224 The multiple crises around the Senkaku Islands have 
changed decision makers’ perception toward China as well. The decision makers of the 
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Japanese government regarded rising China as their major security concern in the long 
run.225 China’s rising power and assertive foreign policy against Japan developed China 
into a regional rival regardless of the Japanese government and the public.226  
Expanded anti-Chinese sentiment resulting from this threat perception, especially 
related to the territorial sovereignty around the Senkaku Islands, deeply connected to 
Japanese nationalism. During Abe’s second tenure, the Japanese people have shown a 
passive attitude toward adopting Abe’s security agenda; the majority of the public widely 
supported the cabinet’s resolute actions in dealing with Senkaku conflicts with China 
without larger aversions, however. These Japanese sentiments originated from Japan’s 
“effective control” of Senkaku and can be called Senkaku nationalism.227 A concept of 
effective control is not assertive but an adequate slogan; thus, this idea is valid enough to 
appeal to the public because the principle is based on international law.228 A multi-
generational coalition could rally around the Senkaku nationalism.229  
Abe has politically exploited the Senkaku nationalism to use for his own political 
ambition. The public has put political pressure on the cabinet to maintain a hard stance 
toward China around the Senkaku issue. Growing Japanese skepticism of China made it 
hard for the cabinet to compromise with China and created political opportunism for 
politicians.230 As the public’s demand for a hard line to the Senkaku issue increased, 
China discourse became a punching bag in Japanese electoral campaigns.231 Abe used 
benefits of the Senkaku nationalism in the elections. When tension between China and 
Japan around Senkaku was high in 2012, Abe was back in office and regained power by 
emphasizing no compromise over territorial sovereignty with China during the election 
campaign.  
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Senkaku nationalism has also influenced Abe’s proactive pacifism policy. Abe 
continuously sought to convince the public of the necessity of a new grand strategy. He 
would fundamentally change the security strategy that had been maintained from the time 
of the Yoshida Doctrine. The Yoshida Doctrine, in place since the Second World War, 
was a grand strategy of Japan as a commercial state to achieve great economic power 
under the security umbrella of the United States.232 Although the Yoshida Doctrine had 
achieved high growth and economic capability, it is not a normal strategy in Abe’s eyes. 
Abe cannot remain satisfied with Japan’s economic reputation alone, because Japan had a 
shocking experience in its economic aid to Iraq war.233 Despite providing large scale war 
expenditures, Japan gained little economic devotion from Kuwait.234 Abe’s vision is to 
return to being a normal state that is able to use its armed forces. This is because Japan 
would not only protect its territory, such as the Senkaku Islands, but also improve its 
national reputation by contributing military support to the world, which it cannot do 
unless it possesses a strong military capability. Senkaku nationalism would be helpful to 
strengthen this philosophy, and Abe also kept promoting Senkaku nationalism to the 
public in order to pass the collective self-defense bill. Therefore, Senkaku nationalism 
would continue to support a narrative of amendment of Article 9 and normalization 
trajectory, unless the Senkaku conflict could be resolved to a certain extent between 
China and Japan.  
C. THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
1. North Korea 
Provocations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have 
continued during both of Abe’s tenures and gradually increased regional instability in 
Northeast Asia. The advent of new leader Kim Jong-un, successor to his father Kim Jong-
il, brought additional political uncertainty to the region. Also, North Korea’s advanced 
nuclear technology, including five nuclear tests, nuclear miniaturizing efforts and long 
                                                 
232 Samuels, Securing Japan. 




range missile capability, directly heightened security concerns in Japan. These North 
Korean military capabilities and missile tests have rapidly threatened the area of Japan’s 
sovereignty. As a result, these security concerns became one of the factors for the Abe 
administration to cite for political justification to gradually increase its defense capability. 
Japan is no longer surprised by North Korea’s provocations. Since North Korea’s 
nuclear program was unveiled to the world in the 1990s, five nuclear tests and numerous 
missile launches have occurred, as detailed in Figure 10. In particular, for Japan, it was a 
shock when North Korea’s Taepodong missile was launched over Japanese airspace in 
August 1998.235 This direct security menace was almost the first such experience from 
North Korea, although Japan already regarded North Korea as a suspicious state. The 
sinking of a DPRK “secret vessel” by Japanese forces was also known as “the first 
incident of Japanese hostile fire” during its post-war history. 236  Japanese hostile 
sentiment was at its peak when past Japanese abductions by North Korean agents were 
revealed to the public. North Korea officially admitted the abductions, and Kim Jong-il 
apologized but confirmed this issue in 2002 Japan-DPRK bilateral talks. As a result, an 
enraged Japanese public frustrated the negotiation of normalization of diplomatic 
relations, one of the agenda items of the bilateral talks. 
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Figure 10.  A Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Tests and Missile Launches237 
Abe has been one of the beneficiaries of anti-North Korea sentiment. As a head of 
government to lead the negotiations with North Korea, Abe took a hard stance on the 
abduction issue. Abe strongly recommended to the cabinet that the five abductees should 
remain in Japan even after their temporary visit to Japan from North Korea to visit their 
families.238 This decision brought about national support by the Japanese regarding North 
Korea as a threat because North Korea took the abductees’ families in North Korea as 
hostages.239 As prime minister since 2006, Abe tried to take advantage of the abduction 
issue to achieve his political objectives, such as constitutional revision discussion and 
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Basic Education Law revision.240 Sentiment toward North Korea worsened when North 
Korea went ahead with its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006. North Korea’s military 
provocation became Japan’s primary security concern, lowering China to second 
place.241 At the same time, sentiment against North Korea constrained policy makers’ 
diplomatic choices. After the nuclear test, policy makers had to seriously reexamine 
missile defense with the United States.242 Even some Japanese politicians began to think 
about Japan possessing its own nuclear option.243 Obviously, the military provocation of 
North Korea provided Abe with sufficient obligation to strengthen the Japanese defense 
capabilities.  
The rise of new North Korean leader Kim Jong-un created unpredictable political 
variables in regional security. When Kim Jong-il died in 2011, many people were 
concerned with the future of North Korea. Kim Jong-un did not have enough time to 
prepare as the regime successor and was too young to be equipped with diverse political 
experiences or the wisdom of age. Through the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incident on 
23 November 2010, however, Kim seemed successful in using his solid political charisma 
to consolidate his power. After the shelling, South Koreans were in panic because direct 
land attack upon the home of general civilians was a new type of military provocation in 
the post-Korean War era. According to Ken Gause, this provocation led by Kim was 
actually his debut as a successor in the regime: “it was an exercise in internal 
communications to the regime, highlighting the heir apparent as a ‘military genius’...Kim 
Jong-un’s first public appearance following the Third Party Conference seemed designed 
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to link him publicly to military operations, especially the artillery command.”244  In 
December 2013, Kim surprised the world again by purging his uncle, Jang Sung-taek. 
Jang was known as the vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission and a “key 
policy adviser” to Kim.245 Since this unexpected political event, Kim has brutally purged 
more officials regardless of political reputation or background. By purging existing 
power holders, he has seemed to consolidate his absolute power within the regime. 
Due to Kim’s unpredictable personality, the uncertainty of Japan’s security has 
gradually increased. As illustrated by Figure 10 above, Kim implemented rapidly 
increased nuclear and missile tests in a relatively short term, compared to his father Kim 
Jong-il. On 12 February 2013, Kim conducted the third nuclear test, and he conducted 
two more in 2016. In spite of tough sanctions from the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) after the fourth nuclear test in January 2016, Kim declared the DPRK to be a 
“nuclear state” at the Korea Worker’s Party (KWP) Central Committee in May. 246 
Furthermore, in August, a missile launched by North Korea fell in Japan’s exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ).247 Recently, North Korea showed bolder behavior by conducting 
the fifth nuclear test on 9 September. Kim Jung-un has seemed to show political 
confidence since the successful fifth nuclear test, notifying the world that the DPRK has 
valid nuclear weapon capabilities and diverse means to launch them. North Korea is 
closer to real nuclear power after the fifth nuclear test, even though many countries still 
officially denying this. 
Reacting to these military threats, Abe was able to politically justify a revised 
security strategy. Soon after Abe’s inauguration in his second tenure, North Korea’s 
nuclear test in early 2013 became a turning point to execute underground work for 
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strengthening the security institution of his cabinet. On 4 December, Abe launched the 
National Security Council (NSC) mainly for promoting better security coordination 
between bureaucrats and communication with the United States.248 Abe also published 
the National Security Strategy (NSS) to specify his security contents. As a part of this 
institutional achievement, the cabinet approved replacement of the old Three Principles 
on Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines with a new Three Principles on 
Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology on 1 April 2014.249 The new principles 
allowed the Japanese to sell/transfer their defense equipment and technology abroad. This 
new posture was a fundamental change of defense policy maintained since post-WWII 
because the former principles banned defense munitions exports. The new principles 
mainly originated in response to China’s military rise and North Korea’s advanced 
nuclear and missile capability.250 In the same manner, the North Korean nuclear crisis 
was largely responsible for the 2015 new security bills. Abe’s strong security drive is not 
irrelevant, given the regional uncertainty provide by the Kim regime. Christopher Hughes 
argued that the successive provocations of North Korea have accelerated the Japanese 
normalization discourse.251 The combination of real armed power and Kim Jong-un’s 
disordered characteristics have led the Japanese people to recognize him as an urgent 
existing threat, providing the Abe cabinet with corresponding justification. Thus, North 
Korea’s provocation can be seen as a political gift to Japanese conservatives who want to 
change the JSDF into a normal military.  
2. South Korea 
For Japan, trilateral relations with the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) are 
essential to maintain regional stability. Historical disputes, however, were a major 
obstacle to the bilateral relation between Japan and South Korea and, therefore, also a 
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negative factor for U.S.-Japan alliance. Unlike in his first tenure, Abe adopted pragmatic 
diplomacy with South Korea and achieved a notable result, the “comfort women 
agreement.” The agreement has helped Abe to improve his uncompromising image both 
at home and abroad. Furthermore, Abe opened the door for better cooperation with South 
Korea, and for better trilateral relations as well. In this section, the comfort women 
agreement is the focus. I will briefly examine its implications for the second Abe 
administration. 
In his first administration, Abe’s aggressive historical revision faced domestic 
backlash as well as strong anti-Japan sentiment from South Korea. Japan and South 
Korea have shared strong values including democracy, a market system, and parallel 
alliances with the United States; their relationships are complicated, however. That is 
mostly because historical grievances resulting from Japan’s occupation of the Korean 
Peninsula are not settled. The comfort women issue became a symbol accelerating 
diplomatic conflicts caused by identity clashes between Japan and South Korea. Most 
Korean mass media were negative toward Abe’s historical perceptions. 
For a time, Abe’s historical view continued into his second tenure, worsening 
relations with South Korea. Abe ordered a review of the 1993 Kono statement, which 
accepted that the Japanese Imperial Army had forced Asian women into “sexual slavery” 
during WWII. 252  Abe also undermined South Korean expectations by not showing 
further reconciliation in his speech at the Seventieth National Memorial Ceremony for the 
War Dead.253 As a result, only on 2 November 2015, for the first time, were bilateral 
formal talks held between Park and Abe. This step had taken three years and five months 
since the trilateral talks among South Korea-China-Japan. 
Abe has changed his existing attitude, however, pursuing settlement of the 
comfort women issue. Surprisingly, on 29 December 2015, South Korea and Japan 
reached an agreement on this issue. The Japanese government officially admitted “an 
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involvement of the Japanese military authorities” with comfort women. 254  Japanese 
Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said that “Prime Minister Abe expresses anew his most 
sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and 
painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort 
women” and, to create a fund for these damages, the Japanese government pledged 1 
billion yen ($8.3 million).255 In response, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se 
stated that Seoul would consider the issue “irreversibly” resolved. 256  This sudden 
agreement was a surprise to both countries’ people and the world as well. 
The United States’ commitment to this issue was an important factor in reaching 
the agreement, and Japan and South Korea seemed to synchronize a pragmatic way to 
cooperate at a higher level on mutual regional interests. The U.S. government has put 
pressure on Japan and South Korea to settle historical grievances peacefully. From the 
United States’ perspective, the trilateral relationship is one of the most significant 
elements in securing political stability in Northeast Asia under the Obama Asia-Pacific 
rebalancing strategy. Abe also attempted to reduce political friction with the United 
States by settling this historical matter. Through the comfort women agreement, Japan 
and South Korea responded to a strategic demand of the United States. Victor Cha argues 
that sharing an alliance with the United States has a strong convergence effect on the 
Japan-ROK relations, according to his ROK-Japan quasi-alliance theory.257 Japan and 
South Korea grasped an opportunity to stress the forward-looking trilateral U.S.-Japan-
ROK partnership for the Asia region 
The comfort women agreement is meaningful for the Abe cabinet in several ways. 
Japan took a major step to settle one of the most complex historic issues between Japan 
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and South Korea. The comfort women issue, including other historic disputes, had 
prevented enhancing the relationships between the two states over two decades. By 
settling the comfort women issue, Japan and South Korea gained momentum to develop a 
new relationship. 
The agreement will be also helpful to Japan’s normalization trajectories. 
Internationally, many countries, even its ally the United States, worried about Japan’s 
being revisionist. The Japanese, however, showed that they were able to solve conflicts 
among countries peacefully. In addition, this behavior will increase Japan’s international 
reputation and support its effort to be one of the permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council in the long run.  
The agreement gave Abe an opportunity to pave the way for a positive political 
image. Some people were concerned that a rapid shift to the right by Abe would not take 
Japan’s neighbors, China and South Korea, into consideration. Even though Abe had a 
strong revisionist image, through the comfort women agreement, he proved that he also 
has a political mind and the capability to reduce tensions for regional stability. This 
agreement allowed Abe to take advantage of opportunities to persuade those who may 
otherwise oppose him. Abe was able to gain trust from the public to pursue his further 
domestic and foreign policies. 
Lastly, the settlement allows Japan to frame further disputes around the comfort 
women issue as a Korean domestic issue. The official statement of the agreement said 
that this issue was resolved “finally and irreversibly.”258 Japan can claim they are no 
longer responsible for Korean dissatisfaction on the premise that Japan fulfilled their 
duties as specified by the agreement faithfully. At least, Abe was able to escape from the 
criticism that Japan is the only problematic actor on the comfort women dispute. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis focused on the differences between Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s 
two premierships and on how he transformed his second tenure into a success. As he 
depicts himself, Abe is the main revisionist within the Japanese normalization movement. 
Abe led the cabinet during two non-consecutive tenures; the outcomes of his two cabinets 
were different, however. While his first administration from 2006 to 2007 ended 
relatively quickly due to the sudden drop of approval ratings in his cabinet, Abe’s second 
administration from 2012 has been successful in ensuring political stability and 
maintaining its approval in several elections. In the security domain, especially, unlike 
his first tenure, Abe has also succeeded in his second tenure in expanding the level of 
permissible use of force from only the self-defense level, as maintained since the end of 
the WWII, to the level of collective self-defense with Japan’s allies. Since there has been 
little academic research on this topic, the huge gap between the political outcomes of 
Abe’s two tenures was the main motivation to pursue this study, with the following 
questions in mind: (1) what factors have differentiated these outcomes? (2) what has 
produced Abe’s relative success in his second administration? 
To answer this question, this thesis compared the two Abe administrations, 
focusing particularly on agenda setting, economic policy, election tactics, and security 
policy. One of the most distinguishing features between the administrations was Abe’s 
political agenda. In his first tenure, Abe primarily focused on ideological issues by 
introducing his political philosophy, “beautiful country.” Abe developed the beautiful 
country discourse through diverse domestic policies, including patriotic textbook reform, 
Fundamental Law of Education revision, and the amendment of Article 9. This focus had 
the ultimate goal of amending Article 9. Meanwhile, in Abe’s second administration, 
Abenomics was a top priority of his cabinet, promoting economic policy. Abenomics 
created significant political momentum for Abe in his second administration. First, 
Abenomics fit the primary concern of the majority of the Japanese people. Second, its 
initial economic outcomes increased the people’s positive expectations for economic 
revitalization and escaping from long-lasting economic stagnation. Third, and most 
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important, Abe was able to recover his political image from his political failure in the last 
tenure. These two different agendas created different electoral outcomes. While political 
scandals disrupted his first tenure, the main reason for the public’s rejection was 
unfamiliarity with his ideological agenda. As a result, Abe lost the 2007 Upper House 
election. In contrast, during his second tenure, the initial success of Abenomics let Abe 
create initial political stability by securing a majority of both houses. Abe’s election 
tactics were also significant in strengthening his premiership. Abe’s call for a snap 
election in 2014 enabled his cabinet to gain a political foothold and establish long-term 
stability. Victory in the snap election was based on Abe’s elaborate political calculus to 
overcome an Abenomics crisis prompted by a consumption tax rise. By focusing his 
election campaign thoroughly on the economic agenda, Abe accumulated political 
capital. Victories in all elections during his second tenure created a conducive 
environment for developing Abe’s security policy. Unlike in his first tenure, Abe 
achieved his security policy objectives step-by-step by spending his political capital. 
From establishing the NSC to passing the collective self-defense bills, Abe was 
successful in the security domain as well.  
At the individual level, unlike his first administration, Abe’s pragmatism in 
statecraft was crucial for political success in his second administration. Abe adopted a 
pragmatic approach to accomplish his political objectives, in contrast to the 
uncompromising political stance through which he failed to promote his policy in his first 
administration. When Abe returned in 2012, his first motivation was taking political 
power back from the DPJ. Abe demonstrated his pragmatism by aligning his top-priority 
agenda to economic issues, the primary concern of the voters. Unlike in his first 
administration, Abe separated his security agenda from the election campaign. In 
addition, in every election, Abe picked up new economic slogans and revealed new 
economic pledges right before the elections. Abe actively used public polls in his policy 
and election strategy as well. For instance, he reversed his pledge to postpone the sales 
tax rise in the 2016 Upper House election. Abe was politically influenced by prevailing 
negative opinion toward the tax rise issue and, at the same time, exploited high support of 
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the public by skillfully planning President Obama’s historic visit to Hiroshima before the 
election. 
Abe’s pragmatism continued even after he gained control of both houses and even 
as he applied himself to the security domain. Through a step-by-step approach in the 
security area, Abe avoided the failures of his first tenure. He used his prerogative as a 
prime minister to change the agenda when he chose to. When he was confident in his 
public approval, Abe changed his agenda from economy to security and promoted a 
deepened security policy. Conversely, when he seemed relatively weak – for example 
after passing the collective self-defense bill – Abe tried to switch the agenda to economic 
issues such as TPP and the 100 Million Japanese Citizens’ Active Roles policy. Abe’s 
flexible policy choice under favorable or non-favorable political conditions enabled him 
to minimize his political damage. Abe’s pragmatic strategy proved one of his success 
mechanisms in his second administration, emphasizing a correlation between managing 
political indicators and his policy execution.  
Abe’s pragmatism originated in his own political experiences – both his failures 
and his successes. Political failure during Abe’s first administration became an asset in 
managing domestic affairs in his second administration. Comparing both his tenures 
shows that Abe has learned a lesson on the politics of compromise. For Abe, escaping 
from uncompromising ideological discourse and embracing a pragmatic position was 
helpful to shape political stability in his second administration. Upon gaining a majority 
in both Houses through his pragmatic approach, Abe was able to concentrate on 
enhancing the security environment in his preferred direction.  
At the domestic level, multiple factors influenced Abe’s political success. Former 
administrations politically influenced each Abe administration that followed. During his 
first tenure, Abe was overconfident due to the high popularity that he inherited from 
former Prime Minister Koizumi. As a result, he excessively exhausted political capital in 
the reform security agenda. In the process of taking power back from the DPJ, however, 
Abe thoroughly emphasized economic revival to appeal to the public; this approach 
brought about political stability. So far, this formula has not failed him in elections.  
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Unlike in his first tenure, Abe has also maintained political dominance within the 
LDP. In the 2015 LDP presidential election, no candidates competed with Abe. The main 
reason for his dominance was the political capital he accumulated. Abe’s influence within 
his party seems absolute. Recent movements to amend party rules expanding the 
maximum term of the party president further suggests Abe’s dominance within his party. 
Abe’s strong leadership seems likely to extend his presidency of his party and to allow 
him to serve as the premier as well until 2021.  
Another factor in Abe’s domestic success is the weakness of the opposition 
parties. Most importantly, the DPJ lost its ability to politically check and balance Abe. 
The DPJ’s lack of popularity was reflected in its political image of incompetency during 
its ruling period from 2009 to 2012. DPJ’s image was fueled by its lack of experience in 
governing, its lack of policy coordination with bureaucrats and its ally the United States, 
and its inadequate response to a natural disaster, the Great Tohoku Earthquake. Unlike in 
Abe’s first administration, the voters lost the opportunity to choose an alternative in 
elections. Furthermore, fragmentation among the opposition parties added to LDP’s 
dominance in domestic politics. 
In his second tenure, political instability and a worsened economic environment 
created deep economic downturn; all these negative economic events, however, provided 
Abe with a favorable political environment for his strong economic drive, Abenomics. 
Since Koizumi’s retirement, multiple changes of prime ministers in a relatively short 
period interrupted economic reform. In particular, successive power shifts between the 
LDP and the DPJ discouraged economic recovery by preventing the government from 
promoting a coherent economic policy. In addition, the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 
and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 worsened the government’s ability to spend 
heavily on social programs. Under this situation, Abe’s new economic policy found a 
way to overcome the economic crisis with unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus. 
Whether Abe’s economic policy seemed likely to be successful or not, it seemed difficult 
to imagine another economic option than Abenomics. 
At the international level, Japan’s relationships within its regional political 
environment provided Abe with relatively positive circumstances for developing his 
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security discourse. In particular, the U.S.-Japan alliance was a core element for 
expanding Japan’s security capability. Traditionally, Japan’s security capability evolved 
under the U.S.-Japan alliance, and its relations worsened during DPJ rule. The U.S.-Japan 
alliance, however, soon recovered and became much stronger under the second Abe 
administration, as Obama’s Asia rebalancing strategy fit Abe’s proactive pacifism 
diplomacy. By sharing economic, military, and ideological strategic benefits in the region 
with the United States, Abe was able to achieve substantial security policy advances. For 
example, during the 2014 U.S.-Japan summit, Abe reduced security concerns over the 
Senkaku Islands by the U.S. reassurance to defend Senkaku based on the U.S.-Japan 
Defense Treaty. Abe also complied with the U.S. Asia rebalancing strategy by modifying 
security bills. At this time, the U.S. government officially supported the Japanese cabinet 
decision of re-interpretation toward exercising the right of collective self-defense. 
Although the bill was controversial due to insufficient explanation by the cabinet, and it 
produced domestic backlash, Abe was able to overcome this political crisis with the 
combination of his political capital and support of the United States. 
The power shift between China and Japan changed the Japanese perception of 
China, and Abe politically utilized Japanese nationalism in order to justify his security 
discourse. Although Japan overwhelmed China during the Cold War, under China’s 
peaceful development strategy, Japan could not ignore China’s rise in economic and 
military power in the region. China surpassed Japan in economic power and in military 
investment and modernization speed. In addition, Xi Jinping’s assertive Chinese foreign 
policy has deepened Japanese security concerns in the region. Those Japanese security 
concerns were deepened by the 2012 Senkaku territorial dispute with China. In particular, 
the conflict deeply connected to national sovereignty and security interests such as 
strategic geopolitical benefits, including energy, resources, maritime and air space. These 
essential elements causing incompatible relations between the two countries gave people 
a sense of rivalry. As tensions within both countries increased, a rivalry sentiment among 
the people increased threat perception and strong nationalism. Senkaku nationalism 
encouraged strong cohesion between politicians and the public. Abe exploited this 
domestic sentiment in elections to expand and reproduce Japanese normalization 
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discourse. U.S.-Japan cooperation against China is also a strong pillar to support Abe’s 
normalization trajectory. The combination of domestic nationalism and the U.S.-Japan 
alliance promotes a normalization movement related to rising China. 
With the Korean Peninsula, primarily, Abe exploited North Korea’s provocations 
as political justification to revise security policy. Already, in his time in the Koizumi 
cabinet, Abe had gained national popularity via the Japanese abduction issue. After Kim 
Jong-un took power as the successor to Kim Jong-il, regional uncertainty considerably 
increased. Abe’s hard-line stance was maintained toward North Korea, as North Korea 
has been a serious security concern due to severe military challenges such as successive 
nuclear and ballistic missile tests. In reaction to these military threats, Abe gradually 
increased security policy initiatives such the new Three Principles on Transfer of Defense 
Equipment and Technology, a change of former principles banning defense munitions 
exports sustained since the end of the WWII. Japan’s relations with South Korea have 
been undermined due to chronic historical interpretation issues, although the bilateral 
relationship is significant for responding to North Korea crisis. Abe achieved a political 
settlement over the comfort women 2015, however. Abe was able to strengthen the 
trilateral relations of the U.S.-Japan-ROK and improve his own image to the global 
society as well. 
This thesis suggests some implications for the future of Abe and normalization 
trajectory. It seems that Abe, domestically, will continue his political dominance. There 
seem to be no alternative politicians within the LDP or among the opposition parties exist 
to threaten Abe. The LDP is discussing extending Abe’s presidency to 2021. The DP (the 
Democratic Party, the recently-adopted name of the former DPJ) still holds low approval 
ratings, although the public appears open to the new opposition party leader, Renho. 
Internationally, the political situation shows no sign of reversing its trajectory in 
Northeast Asia:  competitive relations between the United States and China seem to be 
continuing in the region. North Korea’s nuclear crisis is also at a standstill after the fifth 
nuclear test. Thus, the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to accelerate the countries’ close 
strategic relationship. Recently, Japan resumed talks with South Korea about military 
information-sharing, discussing a General Security of Military Information Agreement 
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(GSOMIA). This would be helpful for Abe to strengthen security dealing with nuclear 
and missile threats of North Korea. 
 Rather than external factors, Abe’s persistent success will depend on his 
economic policy. Since Abe decided on a consumption tax increase, Abenomics did not 
show as great economic results as first expected. Japan’s financial transparency worsened 
due to increased national debts, since the government has applied unprecedented fiscal 
and monetary policy during four years. The people have also questioned the three arrows 
of Abenomics economic reform, because Japan is entering an accelerating time of aging 
society and low birth rates. Still, Abe regards Abenomics as his top priority; therefore, his 
further political success is up to Abenomics in the long run.  
Also, responding to the high desire of the Japanese public for economic 
restoration was a significant factor in determining the Prime Minister’s flexibility in 
managing diverse internal and external affairs. From this view, for the future of Japan, 
the outcomes of economic restoration will be a significant factor for the regime and 
normalization trajectories as well. Considering his pragmatic approach during his second 
administration, for continuing success, it seems Abe will need to continue his 
pragmatism. By utilizing political events such as the 2020 Tokyo Olympics to his 
advantage, Abe may be able to create a further favorable environment to develop security 
discourse.  
At the present time, however, revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is 
the most significant challenge for Abe. Since an amendment of Article 9 is considered 
Abe’s lifework, Abe may approach the issue more cautiously. He has said that specific 
elements of the Constitution to be amended will be established through Diet and public 
debates, “which will deepen our understanding of the issue.”259 Recently, the Japanese 
Emperor’s declaration of his intent to abdicate his throne has made the amendment of 
constitution discourse more complex. 260  Since the amendment of Article 9 is an 
extremely sensitive political matter, Abe may have no choice but to take a prudent 
                                                 
259 “Abe Makes Clear His Desire to Amend Pacifist Article 9,” The Asahi Shimbun, 4 February 2016, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201602040066.  
260 Smith, “US-Japan Relations: Hiroshima to Hague.” 
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attitude. Postponing or abandoning revision of Article 9 might be one alternative, since 
Article 9 is strongly connected with Japanese protectiveness toward Constitution, an 
attitude that has held since the Constitution came into effect in 1947. Ultimately, how 
Abe approaches amending Article 9 seems to be most crucial; and in the process, Abe 
will need to pay careful attention to the trends of public opinion. 
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